Listen to this Post
How the CVE Works
The vulnerability in pgAdmin 4 on Windows stems from the insecure use of `shell=True` in Python’s `subprocess` calls during backup and restore operations. This practice allows the shell to interpret command-line arguments. When a user provides a file path for a backup or restore, this input is directly incorporated into a shell command without proper sanitization. An attacker can craft a malicious file path containing shell metacharacters (e.g., &, |, ;) to break out of the intended command and inject arbitrary system commands. These commands are then executed with the privileges of the pgAdmin process, leading to a full compromise of the underlying Windows host.
Platform: pgAdmin 4
Version: <= 9.9
Vulnerability: Command Injection
Severity: Critical
date: 11/13/2025
Prediction: Patch by 01/31/2026
What Undercode Say:
Analytics
Simulating the vulnerable command construction $ backup_file="normal_backup.sql" $ echo "pg_dump -f $backup_file" This is the intended safe command $ malicious_file="malicious.sql & whoami" $ echo "pg_dump -f $malicious_file" This executes 'whoami'
Example of vulnerable Python code using subprocess
import subprocess
user_input = "user_provided_path & calc.exe" Malicious input
subprocess.call(f"pg_dump -f {user_input}", shell=True) Executes calculator
How Exploit:
An attacker crafts a malicious file path during a backup or restore operation. For example, entering a path like `C:\backup.sql & type C:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts` would cause the `type` command to execute, revealing sensitive file contents. This allows for unauthorized file read, data exfiltration, or execution of other system programs.
Protection from this CVE
Upgrade pgAdmin 4.
Avoid untrusted user input.
Use `shell=False` in code.
Apply principle of least privilege.
Impact:
Remote Code Execution.
Complete System Compromise.
Data Breach Potential.
Privilege Escalation.
🎯Let’s Practice Exploiting & Learn Patching For Free:
Sources:
Reported By: nvd.nist.gov
Extra Source Hub:
Undercode

