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In Anyscale Ray 2.52.0, the management interfaces, including the dashboard and Jobs API, default to having token-based authentication disabled. This occurs because the environment variable RAY_AUTH_MODE must be explicitly set to “token” to enable authentication. Without this setting, the interfaces accept requests without any authentication checks. A remote attacker with network access to these interfaces can directly communicate with them. The attacker can then interact with the Jobs API to submit arbitrary job submissions. These jobs can contain code that the Ray cluster executes. This leads to remote code execution on all cluster nodes. The vulnerability stems from an insecure default configuration that assumes administrator intervention. The product initializes with this weak default, which is not secure for production environments. Network access to the dashboard or API ports is sufficient for exploitation. Attackers can use simple HTTP requests to trigger job execution. For instance, they can send POST requests to the jobs endpoint with malicious payloads. The cluster processes these jobs as trusted commands. This bypasses any intended security boundaries. The default state assumes a trusted network, which is often not the case. The interfaces may be exposed on internal networks or inadvertently to the internet. This vulnerability is particularly severe in cloud deployments. It allows full compromise of the Ray cluster’s resources and data. The vendor recognizes this and plans to change the default in a future release. Until then, clusters remain vulnerable unless manually configured.
Platform: Anyscale Ray
Version: 2.52.0
Vulnerability: Insecure default authentication
Severity: Critical
Date: Unspecified
Prediction: Future release patch
What Undercode Say:
Analytics:
Checking authentication status: `echo $RAY_AUTH_MODE`
Testing dashboard access: `curl http://
Listing jobs unauthenticated: `curl http://
Submitting a job: `curl -X POST http://
Enabling authentication: `export RAY_AUTH_MODE=token`
How Exploit:
Attacker scans for open Ray dashboard ports.
Connects to Jobs API without credentials.
Crafts job with arbitrary code payload.
Submits job via HTTP POST request.
Cluster executes code remotely.
Protection from this CVE:
Set RAY_AUTH_MODE=token.
Use network firewalls.
Implement strict access controls.
Update to future versions.
Impact:
Remote code execution.
Cluster compromise.
Data breach risk.
Resource hijacking possible.
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
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