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In Android’s runtime safety mechanism, the UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer (UBSan) is a critical component designed to catch undefined behaviors in C/C++ code, such as integer overflows or invalid pointer dereferences. The vulnerability resides in the `ubsan_throwing_runtime.cpp` file, which manages how UBSan reports these errors.
A logic error within multiple functions of this component creates a flawed state machine. When UBSan detects a specific undefined behavior, the runtime logic is supposed to handle it gracefully. However, due to an improper validation or control flow flaw, the routine enters a non-recoverable error state.
Specifically, the code fails to reset internal flags or release resources after a sanitizer violation, causing the UBSan runtime to believe it is persistently in a fault state. Subsequent calls to the sanitizer, even for unrelated operations, will see this stale error status and crash immediately. The logic becomes trapped: the system attempts to call the error handler, the handler fails due to the residual state, and the program (or system component) hangs indefinitely.
This triggers a permanent Denial of Service (DoS). As the runtime component becomes unresponsive, any process depending on it will crash or freeze. Since the UBSan runtime is embedded in core system libraries, this collapse leads to a complete system stall that typically requires a hard reboot to resolve. The attack requires no special privileges and no user interaction, making it easily exploitable by any local application.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: Android AOSP
Version: 14, 15, 16
Vulnerability: Logical malfunction
Severity: Medium (5.5)
date: 2026-06-01
Prediction: 2026-07-05
What Undercode Say:
The following analytics can be used by threat analysts to detect potential exploitation attempts:
Monitor system logs for repetitive UBSan crash patterns adb logcat | grep -E "UBSAN|ubsan_throwing_runtime|undefined behavior" Check for kernel panic signatures caused by sanitizer failures dmesg | grep -i "ubsan" Review tombstone files for abort signals from libc++ ls -la /data/tombstones/ | grep -i "ubsan" Real-time detection using inotifywait on crash directories inotifywait -m /data/tombstones/ -e create | grep -E "tombstone_[0-9]"
Exploit:
A local attacker triggers the vulnerability by causing a specific undefined behavior (UB) that the sanitizer cannot handle. This can be done by compiling a simple native binary with the following pseudo-code or by injecting a crafted data stream into an app that uses the UBSan runtime:
// Vulnerable Function Call Pattern
void trigger_crash() {
// Force an integer overflow on a signed integer (UB)
int overflow = INT_MAX;
overflow += 1; // Triggers UBSan check
// Due to the logic error, the runtime enters a deadlock
// Further calls will cause a permanent DoS
cause_logic_error_loop();
}
Protection:
To mitigate CVE-2026-0067, apply the official Android security patch released by Google. The patch addresses the flawed logic in ubsan_throwing_runtime.cpp:
– Patch Deployment: Update the Android Security Patch Level to 2026-07-05 or later.
– Workaround: If patching is delayed, disable specific UBSan checks by modifying the build configuration:
Disable UBSan runtime checks (mitigation, not a fix) export UBSAN_OPTIONS=halt_on_error=0:print_stacktrace=1
Impact:
The impact is a Permanent Local Denial of Service. Successful exploitation renders the device unresponsive until a forced reboot. Given the low attack complexity, any installed application can crash the system without user interaction. This severely affects device availability and reliability, particularly in enterprise or multi-tenant environments.
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Sources:
Reported By: nvd.nist.gov
Extra Source Hub:
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