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The vulnerability resides in multiple functions of sdp_discovery.cc, a core component of the Android Bluetooth stack handling Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) transactions. SDP is used to discover services offered by remote Bluetooth devices (e.g., audio, file transfer). The flaw is a heap buffer overflow triggered during the parsing of specially crafted SDP response packets. When the local device initiates an SDP request (e.g., during service discovery), the remote device can reply with a malicious SDP attribute value that contains an excessively long data field. The vulnerable code does not properly validate the length of incoming data before copying it into a fixed-size heap buffer using functions like memcpy. An attacker positioned within Bluetooth range (proximal/adjacent network) can send this malformed SDP response without any prior pairing or user interaction. The overflow overwrites adjacent heap metadata or critical function pointers, leading to arbitrary code execution within the `bluetooth` process context (which runs with system privileges). Because no user interaction is needed and the attack is remotely executable over Bluetooth, the severity is critical. Exploitation can result in full compromise of the Bluetooth stack, allowing the attacker to install malware, exfiltrate data, or pivot to other system components. The issue affects all Android versions that include the vulnerable code path, which has existed since Android 10 but manifests differently due to memory management changes in later releases. Attackers can trigger the overflow by broadcasting malicious SDP responses during active discovery scans, making any device with Bluetooth enabled a potential target.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: Android
Version: 14, 15, 16
Vulnerability: Heap buffer overflow
Severity: Critical
date: June 1 2026
Prediction: June 15 2026
What Undercode Say:
Analytics:
Check Bluetooth stack version on Android
adb shell dumpsys bluetooth_manager | grep -i "stack version"
Monitor SDP packet captures
adb shell su -c "tcpdump -i btmon -s 0 -w /sdcard/sdp_traffic.pcap"
Reproduce heap corruption via fuzzing script (conceptual)
for offset in {0..1024}; do
echo -e "\x02\x00\x$(printf '%04x' $offset)\x41\x90" | nc -u -b <target_bt_addr> 1
done
Extract heap metadata after overflow
adb shell cat /proc/$(pidof com.android.bluetooth)/smaps | grep -A5 "[bash]"
Exploit:
An attacker uses a Bluetooth-enabled device with raw HCI access (e.g., a Linux machine with BlueZ) to craft an SDP_ErrorResponse or SDP_ServiceSearchAttributeResponse packet. The malicious payload includes a `data_element` of type `DE_STRING` or `DE_URL` with a length field set to a value larger than the destination buffer (e.g., 0x200 bytes when the heap chunk is only 0x100 bytes). Upon receiving this response, `sdpu_get_attr_value()` or `sdp_dissect()` copies the oversized data, overwriting heap headers. By controlling the overflow content, the attacker redirects execution to a `calloc` or `free` hook, achieving remote code execution with system privileges.
Protection:
- Disable Bluetooth discovery when not in use: `adb shell settings put global bluetooth_discovery_timeout 0`
– Apply vendor security patches (expected June 2026). Backport fixes from AOSP that add bounds checking using `checked_copy` functions. - Enable Bluetooth MAC randomization and use “Bluetooth scanning” only over LE (CVE not known to affect LE SDP).
- Deploy network-level isolation for Bluetooth interfaces via `iptables` rules on the `bt-pan` interface.
Impact:
- Remote code execution in Bluetooth daemon ([email protected])
- Full compromise of Android device without user interaction
- Leakage of sensitive data (contacts, SMS) via Bluetooth stack memory read
- Permanent denial of service (crash loop of
com.android.bluetooth) - Potential lateral movement to Wi-Fi or cellular subsystems via shared IPC (binder)
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Sources:
Reported By: nvd.nist.gov
Extra Source Hub:
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