Listen to this Post
The issue stems from a structural boundary violation in the passive scan implementation of OpenEASD prior to version 2.25.4. Passive scanning profiles (including Passive Scan Light and Passive Scan Deep) are contractually defined to operate entirely out-of-band, relying strictly on third-party API feeds, public DNS resolvers, and RDAP records without sending direct network packets to target infrastructure. However, the `domain_security` tool included a lame-delegation validation check that explicitly invoked `dns.query.udp` to issue direct SOA queries directly to the target’s authoritative nameservers. Because querying delegated nameservers inherently requires establishing direct UDP communication with target-owned host systems, passive scan runs actively generated network traffic against target networks. This direct contact breached zero-packet passive scanning guarantees and exposed scanning activity to target intrusion detection systems (IDS) and target security logs. The issue was rectified in version 2.25.4 by shifting the lame-delegation direct SOA probe logic from the passive `domain_security` module into the active `domain_probe` module (which explicitly requires DomainAuthorization).
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: OpenEASD
Version: Prior to 2.25.4
Vulnerability: Information Disclosure
Severity: Low
date: October 7, 2026
Prediction: Patch Released
What Undercode Say:
Analytics
Check installed OpenEASD version python3 -c "import openeasd; print(openeasd.<strong>version</strong>)" Audit passive scan dependencies for direct socket or DNS calls grep -rn "dns.query.udp" src/openeasd/tools/passive/
Remediation in apps/domain_security/checks.py (v2.25.4)
Removed direct authoritative lookup from passive checks
def check_lame_delegation(domain, nameservers):
Direct UDP queries moved exclusively to active probe workflows
raise NotImplementedError("Lame delegation check relocated to active domain_probe")
Exploit: (Educational Purposes!)
PoC showing how passive scan generated direct UDP packets to target NS
import dns.query
import dns.message
target_ns = "ns1.target-example.com"
query = dns.message.make_query("target-example.com", dns.rdatatype.SOA)
Executing direct query against target nameserver during passive scan
response = dns.query.udp(query, target_ns, timeout=2.0)
print(f"Direct packet transmitted to target infrastructure: {response.rcode()}")
Protection:
Upgrade OpenEASD to version 2.25.4 or higher pip install --upgrade openeasd>=2.25.4 Verify pip-audit passes cleanly pip-audit
Impact:
An attacker or unverified operator running a passive scan could inadvertently alert target intrusion detection systems (IDS) and log management tools by sending direct UDP DNS packets to target authoritative nameservers. This breaks the zero-packet requirement for passive reconnaissance, compromising operational anonymity during initial threat assessment phases.
🎯Let’s Practice Exploiting & Learn Patching For Free:
🎓 Live Courses & Certifications:
Join Undercode Academy for Verified Certifications
🚀 Request a Custom Project:
Secure, high-velocity infrastructure and disruptive technological engineering. Contact our engineering team for high-tier development and proprietary systems:
[email protected]
💎 Smart Architecture | 🛡️ Secure by Design | ⭐ Trusted by Thousands
Sources:
Reported By: github.com
Extra Source Hub:
Undercode
