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The vulnerability works by allowing read-scoped gateway snapshots to inadvertently expose credentials embedded in channel `baseUrl` fields and related endpoint configurations. Internally, OpenClaw uses `config.get` to retrieve channel settings, including the `baseUrl` for services like messaging platforms. When a snapshot of the gateway configuration is taken (a feature for debugging or state capture), the system serializes these configuration values. Due to a flaw in the snapshot serialization logic, credentials (such as API keys, tokens, or passwords) that were stored as part of the `baseUrl` string (e.g., https://user:[email protected]`) or in adjacent endpoint fields are included in the snapshot output. The snapshot is intended to be read-scoped, but because the credentials are embedded in the configuration data itself, any user or service with read access to the snapshot can view these plaintext secrets. The issue stems from the `channels.status` feature, which aggregates this configuration data without adequately sanitizing or redacting sensitive substrings from URL fields before they are included in the snapshot. The fix, implemented in commitf0202264d0de7ad345382b9008c5963bcefb01b7, introduces a redaction step that strips credentials from URLs and sensitive fields when the configuration is serialized for snapshots or status reporting.
Platform: OpenClaw (npm)
Version: 2026.3.23-2
Vulnerability: Credential exposure
Severity: Moderate
date: Mar 24 2026
<h2 style="color: blue;">Prediction: Already patched (Mar 22)</h2>
<h2 style="color: blue;">Analytics</h2>
<h2 style="color: blue;">What Undercode Say:</h2>
The exposure is due to insufficient data sanitization in configuration serialization. The `config.get` method returns raw values that include secrets, and the snapshot process lacked a redaction filter for common credential patterns in URLs.
<h2 style="color: blue;">Bash Commands and Codes:</h2>
Simulate viewing a vulnerable snapshot (hypothetical) This command shows how config might be output with secrets openclaw config get --snapshot | grep -E 'baseUrl|endpoint' | grep '@' Check for credentials in current status output (if vulnerable) openclaw channels.status | grep -oP 'https?://[^/\s]+@[^/\s]+' Validate fix by checking the commit is present in the build git log --oneline | grep f0202264d0de7ad345382b9008c5963bcefb01b7
<h2 style="color: blue;">How Exploit:</h2>
An attacker with read-scoped access to gateway snapshots (e.g., via a compromised monitoring tool or a malicious plugin with read permissions) retrieves a snapshot. The attacker then parses the snapshot data for `baseUrl` fields, extracting credentials embedded in URLs using regex patterns likehttps?://([^:]+):([^@]+)@. These credentials can be used to authenticate against the original service, potentially leading to lateral movement or data theft.f0202264d0de7ad345382b9008c5963bcefb01b7`.
<h2 style="color: blue;">Protection from this CVE:</h2>
1. Immediate Update: Upgrade OpenClaw to version `v2026.3.22` or later, which includes the redaction fix.
2. Validate Patch: Confirm the installation includes commit
3. Audit Snapshots: Review any snapshots generated prior to the patch and rotate any exposed credentials.
4. Least Privilege: Limit read access to gateway snapshots to only essential administrative users.
Impact:
A malicious actor with read-only snapshot access can obtain valid credentials for third-party services integrated via channels. This can lead to unauthorized access to messaging platforms, cloud services, or internal APIs, potentially escalating to data breaches or account takeovers.
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
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