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This vulnerability exists in JDA’s component handling system when processing `ActionRow` components containing media attachments with external URLs. When `MessagegetComponents()` retrieves components from a user message and passes them to `sendMessageComponents()` or editMessageComponents(), the library automatically resolves Thumbnail, FileDisplay, and `MediaGallery` objects. For versions 6.0.0 through 6.1.2, the resolution process performs an HTTP GET request to any specified `url` field without validation. This occurs during the component serialization/deserialization cycle for message updates, directly invoking the JDAs internal REST action builder which fetches the remote resource to cache or display it. An attacker can embed a crafted component with a `url` pointing to an internal service (e.g., `http://169.254.169.254/`), causing the victim bot’s JDA instance to make an outbound request upon message interaction, leading to potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), information disclosure, or denial-of-service through resource exhaustion.
Platform: JDA (Java Discord API)
Version: >=6.0.0,<6.1.3
Vulnerability : SSRF via Components
Severity: Moderate
date: 2024-12-09
Prediction: Patched 2024-12-09
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Check if your project uses a vulnerable version
grep -r "jda" pom.xml build.gradle | grep -E "6.0.|6.1.[0-2]"
Find usage of affected methods in codebase
find . -name ".java" -exec grep -l "getComponents|sendMessageComponents|editMessageComponents" {} \;
How Exploit:
// Malicious component embedded in a message
ActionRow row = ActionRow.of(Button.secondary("id", "Click me"));
// Bot retrieves components and re-sends them
List<ActionRow> components = event.getMessage().getComponents();
event.getChannel().sendMessageComponents(components).queue(); // Triggers URL fetch
Protection from this CVE
Update to JDA version 6.1.3 or later. Immediately audit code for patterns where components from `MessagegetComponents()` or similar are passed to send/edit methods without sanitization. Implement validation logic to strip or reject components containing `url` fields from untrusted messages before processing. Consider network-level egress filtering for bot applications.
Impact:
Unauthorized external resource download, potential internal network exposure (SSRF), increased bandwidth usage, possible denial-of-service.
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
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