Listen to this Post
How CVE-2026-53461 Works
ImageMagick is a widely used open-source software suite for editing, converting, and manipulating digital images across over 200 formats. The vulnerability resides in the ICON decoder, specifically within the `Read1XImage` function located in coders/icon.c. This function handles Windows 1.0 format icon images, a legacy but still supported format.
The flaw stems from an incorrect loop condition in the decoder’s logic. When processing an ICON image, the function uses `image->columns` as the upper bound for the y‑direction loop (the vertical iteration over image rows). The correct boundary should be image->rows, which represents the actual number of rows in the image.
Under normal circumstances, when an icon’s width (columns) and height (rows) are equal, the loop executes correctly. However, an attacker can craft a malicious ICON file where `rows` and `columns` differ — for example, a tall but narrow icon (e.g., 16×64) or a wide but short one (e.g., 64×16). In such cases, the loop iterates `columns` times in the y‑direction, but the heap‑allocated buffer for the image data is sized according to `rows` × columns.
If `columns` exceeds rows, the loop writes beyond the allocated heap buffer, causing an out‑of‑bounds heap write. This memory corruption typically results in a crash (denial of service), but under specific memory layouts, it could potentially be leveraged for arbitrary code execution.
The vulnerability is remotely exploitable without authentication — an attacker only needs to supply a specially crafted `.ico` file to any service that uses ImageMagick to process untrusted images (e.g., web upload endpoints, email attachments, thumbnail generators). The issue affects all versions prior to 6.9.13-50 and 7.1.2-25.
The patch corrects the loop condition by replacing `image->columns` with image->rows, ensuring the y‑direction iteration matches the actual image height.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: ……. ImageMagick
Version: …….. < 6.9.13-50, < 7.1.2-25
Vulnerability :…… Out-of-bounds Heap Write
Severity: ……. High (CVSS 7.5)
date: ………. June 10, 2026
Prediction: …… June 9, 2026
What Undercode Say (Analytics)
Undercode’s threat intelligence indicates active scanning for ImageMagick endpoints across public cloud environments since the advisory publication. The following analytics and validation commands are recommended:
Check installed ImageMagick version identify -version For Debian/Ubuntu systems dpkg -l | grep imagemagick For RHEL/CentOS/Fedora rpm -qa | grep ImageMagick Scan for vulnerable ICON processing in logs grep -i "icon" /var/log/imagemagick/.log | grep -i "error|crash" Test with a crafted ICON (PoC concept - do not run in production) The following command may trigger the crash on vulnerable versions: convert malicious.ico output.png
Affected Packages (NuGet):
- Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU < 14.14.0
- Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU < 14.14.0
- All Magick.NET variants (x86, x64, arm64, OpenMP) below 14.14.0
Patch Status:
- ImageMagick 6.9.13-50 (released June 9, 2026)
- ImageMagick 7.1.2-25 (released June 9, 2026)
- Magick.NET 14.14.0 (contains patched ImageMagick binaries)
Exploit
The vulnerability is triggered by supplying a crafted Windows ICON (.ico) file where the image `rows` and `columns` values are inconsistent. Specifically:
– The ICON header declares a `rows` value (height) and a `columns` value (width).
– The decoder allocates a heap buffer based on rows × columns.
– The loop that writes pixel data to this buffer uses `columns` as the y‑direction bound.
– If columns > rows, the loop writes past the buffer end.
Proof‑of‑Concept (Conceptual):
// Simplified vulnerable logic in coders/icon.c
for (y = 0; y < image->columns; y++) { // BUG: should be image->rows
for (x = 0; x < image->rows; x++) { // BUG: should be image->columns
// Write pixel to heap buffer
pixel = GetPixelIndex(image, x, y);
SetPixelIndex(image, x, y, pixel);
}
}
A remote attacker can embed such a malformed ICON in:
– A web image upload form
– An email attachment processed by a mail gateway
– A social media profile picture upload
– Any automated image processing pipeline
Exploit Requirements:
- Network access to the target service
- No authentication required
- No user interaction needed
- Crafted ICON file size: typically < 1 MB
Protection
- Upgrade ImageMagick to version 6.9.13-50 or 7.1.2-25 (or later).
- Update Magick.NET packages to 14.14.0 or higher for .NET applications.
3. Apply distribution patches:
- Debian: `imagemagick (8:7.1.2.25+dfsg1-2)`
– Ubuntu: backported patches available in security repositories
4. If immediate patching is not possible:
- Disable ICON format support in ImageMagick’s
policy.xml:<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="ICON" />
- Restrict image uploads to safe formats (PNG, JPEG, WebP) at the application level.
- Run image processing in a sandboxed/containerized environment with limited memory.
- Monitor for crashes or unusual ICON processing in logs.
Impact
- Confidentiality: None (no data leakage)
- Integrity: None (no data modification)
- Availability: High — successful exploitation causes a crash, leading to denial of service
- CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 7.5 (High)
- Attack Vector: Network
- Attack Complexity: Low
- Privileges Required: None
- User Interaction: None
- Scope: Unchanged
Real‑world impact:
- Web services that accept user‑uploaded images can be taken offline repeatedly.
- Email gateways using ImageMagick for attachment scanning may crash, delaying email delivery.
- Thumbnail generation services (e.g., CDNs, CMS platforms) become vulnerable to trivial DoS attacks.
- The vulnerability affects both 32‑bit and 64‑bit builds; no architecture limitation.
Mitigation priority: High — patch immediately if ImageMagick is exposed to untrusted input.
🎯Let’s Practice Exploiting & Learn Patching For Free:
🎓 Live Courses & Certifications:
Join Undercode Academy for Verified Certifications
🚀 Request a Custom Project:
Secure, high-velocity infrastructure and disruptive technological engineering. Contact our engineering team for high-tier development and proprietary systems:
[email protected]
💎 Smart Architecture | 🛡️ Secure by Design | ⭐ Trusted by Thousands
Sources:
Reported By: github.com
Extra Source Hub:
Undercode
