HashiCorp Vagrant, Code Injection via Default Synced Folders, CVE-2025-XXXX (Moderate)

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How the CVE Works:

The vulnerability (CVE-2025-XXXX) in HashiCorp Vagrant (≀ v2.4.6) stems from insecure handling of the default synced folder (/vagrant or C:\vagrant). An attacker with guest VM access can inject malicious Ruby code into the shared Vagrantfile. When the host user executes any `vagrant` command, the infected `Vagrantfile` is parsed as a Ruby script, executing the payload on the host system with the user’s privileges. This bypasses VM isolation, enabling guest-to-host code execution. The risk escalates in multi-tenant environments where guest VM compromise is plausible.

DailyCVE Form:

Platform: HashiCorp Vagrant
Version: ≀ 2.4.6
Vulnerability: Guest-to-host code injection
Severity: Moderate
Date: 2025-07-02

Prediction: Patch by 2025-07-30

What Undercode Say:

Check Vagrant version:
vagrant --version
Example malicious Vagrantfile injection (guest VM):
echo '<code>touch /tmp/pwned</code>' >> /vagrant/Vagrantfile

How Exploit:

1. Gain shell access to guest VM.

2. Append Ruby backdoor to shared `Vagrantfile`.

  1. Wait for host user to run vagrant up/halt.

Protection from this CVE:

  • Disable default synced folders (config.vm.synced_folder ".", "/vagrant", disabled: true).
  • Use read-only mounts (readonly: true).
  • Upgrade to patched version post-release.

Impact:

  • Host system compromise via VM escape.
  • Privilege escalation if host user is admin.

Sources:

Reported By: github.com
Extra Source Hub:
Undercode

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