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CVE-2026-11019 is a security flaw in the Payments component of Google Chrome for Android. The vulnerability stems from an inappropriate implementation that allows a remote attacker—who has already compromised the browser’s renderer process—to perform domain spoofing via a specially crafted HTML page. Domain spoofing means the user sees a website address (e.g., https://paypal.com`) in the address bar, but the content actually originates from a malicious domain controlled by the attacker.
Because the attacker must first compromise the renderer process, this is not a standalone remote‑code‑execution bug. However, once the renderer is under the attacker’s control, the flawed Payments implementation fails to properly validate or restrict the origin of payment‑related interactions. Consequently, the attacker can inject fake payment dialogs that appear to belong to a legitimate site, tricking users into entering sensitive credentials or payment information.
The issue affects all Google Chrome for Android versions prior to 149.0.7827.53. Chromium assigned a security severity of Medium, and Red Hat rated it as Moderate (CVSS:5.6). No known exploitation in the wild has been reported as of 2026‑06‑08, but the attack vector is reliable and could be combined with other renderer‑level exploits to launch convincing phishing campaigns.
The root cause is improper trust of input from the renderer when handling Payment Request API calls. A compromised renderer can manipulate the `PaymentRequest` object to supply forged origin data, which the browser then blindly displays. This bypasses the site isolation guarantees that normally prevent a malicious renderer from spoofing its own origin.
Google addressed the issue in the June 2026 stable channel update (Chrome 149.0.7827.53) by tightening the validation of payment request origins and ensuring that the browser’s UI always reflects the true, verified origin. The fix also includes additional sanitisation steps for data passed from the renderer to the browser process, preventing the injection of misleading origin information.
Users who have not updated to the patched version remain vulnerable. Attackers would need to combine CVE‑2026‑11019 with a separate renderer‑compromise vulnerability, but given the prevalence of such bugs, the risk is non‑negligible.
<h2 style="color: blue;">DailyCVE Form:</h2>
Platform: Google Chrome Android
Version: <149.0.7827.53
Vulnerability: Domain spoofing
Severity: Medium (CVSS:5.6)
Date: 2026‑06‑04
<h2 style="color: blue;">Prediction: Patch 2026‑06‑04</h2>
<h2 style="color: blue;">What Undercode Say:</h2>
- Analytics:
Count vulnerable Chrome versions in logs (example)
grep -E "Chrome/[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+" access.log | \
awk -F'Chrome/' '{print $2}' | cut -d' ' -f1 | \
while read v; do
if [[ "$v" < "149.0.7827.53" ]]; then
echo "Vulnerable: $v"
fi
done | wc -l
- Detection rule (YARA):
rule CVE_2026_11019_domain_spoofing {
strings:
$payments_call = /new PaymentRequest\(/
$fake_origin = /(https?:\/\/)(paypal|bank|amazon)[^\s]/ nocase
condition:
$payments_call and $fake_origin
}
<h2 style="color: blue;">Exploit:</h2>
<h2 style="color: blue;">A typical exploitation flow:</h2>
1. Attacker compromises Chrome’s renderer process (e.g., via a use‑after‑free or memory corruption bug).
2. From the compromised renderer, the attacker constructs a `PaymentRequest` object with a manipulated origin parameter, pointing to a trusted domain (e.g.,https://bank.com`).
3. The browser’s Payments component, before the patch, does not re‑verify the origin and displays the attacker‑supplied domain in the payment UI.
4. The user sees a legitimate payment dialog and submits credentials or payment data, which is actually sent to the attacker’s server.
A minimal proof‑of‑concept (conceptual, not weaponised):
// Attacker-controlled renderer
let paymentMethods = [{
supportedMethods: "basic-card",
data: { merchantOrigin: "https://victim-bank.com" } // spoofed origin
}];
let paymentDetails = { total: { label: "Total", amount: { currency: "USD", value: "99.99" } } };
let request = new PaymentRequest(paymentMethods, paymentDetails);
request.show().then(response => {
// response sent to attacker's server
});
Protection:
- Immediate update: Upgrade Chrome on Android to 149.0.7827.53 or later.
- Enterprise policy: Disable the Payment Request API until patch is applied:
{ "PaymentRequestEnabled": false } - Network mitigation: Block outgoing traffic to known phishing domains using DNS filtering or a web proxy.
- User awareness: Educate users to manually verify the URL in payment dialogs and avoid entering sensitive data on unexpected pop‑ups.
Impact:
Successful exploitation allows an attacker to spoof any domain in the browser’s payment interface. This can lead to:
– Credential theft – users may enter bank or payment service credentials into a fake dialog.
– Financial fraud – unauthorised payments or data exfiltration of payment card details.
– Reputational damage for trusted sites whose identities are impersonated.
– Chaining potential – combined with renderer‑compromise bugs, the attack becomes a reliable phishing vector even on fully patched operating systems.
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
Extra Source Hub:
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