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Intro
The vulnerability stems from a hardcoded JWT signing secret ("random") in two locations of the `dhax/go-base` boilerplate: the `dev.env` template and a `viper.SetDefault` fallback in cmd/serve.go. Even if the `.env` file is missing, the application silently uses `”random”` as the signing key. An attempted mitigation in `auth/jwt/tokenauth.go` checks only for the literal string `”random”` and generates a random 32-byte secret in memory, but this check fails for other weak secrets (e.g., "secret", "changeme", empty string) and the generated key is not persisted, causing all existing tokens to break on restart (a denial‑of‑service). Because the repository is public, any attacker can read the default secret and forge arbitrary JWT tokens, including admin roles. The forged token is accepted by all protected endpoints (e.g., /api/v1/admin/users, /api/v1/me) because the same weak secret is used to verify the token. The refresh endpoint also accepts the forged token, allowing indefinite persistence. This effectively bypasses authentication entirely, granting the attacker full access to the API.
DailyCVE Form
Platform: `dhax/go-base`
Version: `<2026-05-17`
Vulnerability: Hardcoded JWT secret
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.8)
date: 2026-05-17
Prediction: Patch date: 2026-05-17
What Undercode Say
Check if secret is hardcoded "random"
grep -r "AUTH_JWT_SECRET=random" dev.env
grep -r "viper.SetDefault.random" cmd/serve.go
Forge admin token with secret "random"
python3 -c "import jwt; print(jwt.encode({'sub': '[email protected]', 'roles': ['admin']}, 'random', algorithm='HS256'))"
Exploit
- Extract the hardcoded secret `”random”` from the public repository.
- Forge a JWT token with desired claims (e.g., admin role).
- Send the token in the `Authorization: Bearer
` header to any protected endpoint (e.g., /api/v1/admin/users). - The server accepts the forged token, granting unauthorized access.
- Use the same forged token to refresh the session, obtaining new valid tokens indefinitely.
Protection
- Replace the hardcoded secret with a strong, randomly generated secret stored securely outside the codebase (e.g., environment variable).
- Implement a comprehensive check that rejects any known weak secret (e.g.,
"random","secret","changeme","") and enforces a minimum 32‑character length. - Remove any non‑persistent auto‑generation of secrets.
- Regenerate the JWT secret using `openssl rand -base64 32` and update all tokens.
Impact
- Authentication Bypass: Forge tokens for any user, including admin roles.
- Confidentiality: Access all user data, profiles, and protected resources.
- Integrity: Modify any data accessible via the API.
- Persistence: Forged tokens remain valid until expiry or indefinitely via refresh.
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
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