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The mentioned CVEs (three medium-severity issues in arnika) work as follows:
1. UDP ACK timestamp validation bypass (CVE-2024-XXXX-1): In udpserver.go:185, the `udpClient()` function verifies the HMAC and packet type but does not check ackPkt.Timestamp. A MITM attacker can capture a single valid ACK packet, drop all subsequent DATA packets, and replay the stale ACK indefinitely. The primary side advances its PSK on each rotation while the backup stays on key 1, causing tunnel desynchronization. No PSK knowledge is required because the server side already includes the timestamp check – the client lacks it.
2. Empty PQC key file acceptance (CVE-2024-XXXX-2): `repositories/pqc.go:29` uses `os.ReadFile` which follows symlinks. An empty file leads to `base64.Decode(“”)` returning []byte{}, nil. HKDF then runs using only the QKD key, yet logs falsely claim
HKDF derivation completed for QKD+PQC key</code>. Exploitation requires write access to the directory containing <code>PQC_PSK_FILE</code>. 3. Hardcoded InsecureSkipVerify in KMS TLS client (CVE-2024-XXXX-3): `repositories/kms.go:61` unconditionally sets `InsecureSkipVerify: true` for the KMS HTTP client, overriding any `RootCAs` loaded from <code>CA_CERTIFICATE</code>. The CA loading becomes dead code. A MITM attacker between arnika and the KMS endpoint (often co-located) can intercept traffic using any self-signed certificate. Fixes exist in v1.0.1. <h2 style="color: blue;">dailycve form:</h2> Platform: arnika Version: before 1.0.1 Vulnerability: ACK replay, empty PQC, TLS skip Severity: Medium date: 2024-11-15 <h2 style="color: blue;">Prediction: 2024-12-01 (already patched 1.0.1)</h2> <h2 style="color: blue;">What Undercode Say:</h2> Analytics show exploitation requires MITM or local write access – no remote code execution. [bash] Check client ACK timestamp validation grep -n "ackPkt.Timestamp" udpserver.go Expected: missing check in udpClient() Verify PQC key file handling cat /path/to/PQC_PSK_FILE | wc -c Empty file leads to silent HKDF fallback Test KMS TLS configuration openssl s_client -connect kms-server:443 -CAfile ca.crt If InsecureSkipVerify=true, self-signed certs are accepted
Exploit:
- UDP ACK replay: Capture one ACK with tcpdump, then drop DATA packets and replay the ACK using a custom script (see arnika_exploit.tar.gz).
- Empty PQC file: Symlink `/etc/arnika/pqc.key` to `/dev/null` or write an empty file, trigger key derivation.
- KMS MITM: Run `mitmproxy --certs self-signed` between arnika and KMS; the client accepts any certificate.
Protection from this CVE:
- Upgrade to arnika v1.0.1 or later.
- For UDP ACK: Apply server-side timestamp check to client (mirror `udpserver.go` logic).
- For PQC: Validate decoded key non-empty; set strict parent directory permissions (
chmod 750). - For KMS: Remove `InsecureSkipVerify: true` line; ensure `CA_CERTIFICATE` is properly loaded and enforced.
Impact:
- Tunnel desynchronization leading to permanent key mismatch and broken communication.
- Silent security downgrade in hybrid QKD+PQC mode (false logs of HKDF completion).
- Full MITM decryption of KMS traffic, exposing key material and control messages.
- No direct code execution or immediate key extraction; preconditions limit exploitability.
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
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