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Arcane version 2.10.2 suffers from an authorization inconsistency vulnerability within the AuthMiddleware.managerAuth component. When an incoming request supplies an environment access token via the X-Arcane-Agent-Token header, the managerAuth function resolves the environment, provisions an environment-scoped permission set, and immediately continues request execution through the middleware chain. This early-success return happens before the middleware evaluates the AdminRequired option or verifies whether the caller possesses global administrative privileges. Consequently, an environment-scoped token can successfully access administrative endpoints—specifically the Go pprof diagnostic interface located under /api/debug/pprof/—despite the corresponding permission set containing no global or sudo rights. This flawed authorization boundary allows lower-privileged users or automated agents with environment access tokens to query sensitive runtime profiling data, process stack traces, and execution telemetry restricted exclusively to global administrators.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: Arcane
Version: 2.10.2
Vulnerability : Authorization Bypass
Severity: Critical
date: 2024-10-17
Prediction: 2024-10-24
What Undercode Say
Analytics
The vulnerability stems from improper control flow handling in the authentication middleware where the environment token authentication branch invokes `next(c)` prematurely. Because the global `AdminRequired` check follows this check, environment tokens completely bypass administrative verification.
Exploit (Educational Purposes!)
To exploit this authorization bypass, an attacker sends an HTTP GET request to a protected diagnostic endpoint using a valid environment token instead of an administrator session cookie or token:
GET /api/debug/pprof/heap?debug=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: arcane.example.com X-Arcane-Agent-Token: <VALID_ENVIRONMENT_ACCESS_TOKEN>
Protection
Remediate the vulnerability by ensuring that the environment-token authentication path evaluates all configured middleware authorization options (such as AdminRequired) prior to calling next(c):
if envTokenIsValid {
ps := authz.EnvironmentPermissionSet(env.ID)
if m.options.AdminRequired && !ps.IsGlobalAdmin() {
return c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, common.APIError{Code: "FORBIDDEN", Message: "Access denied"})
}
environmentScopedInternal(c, env)
return next(c)
}
Impact
Successful exploitation grants unauthorized access to internal runtime telemetry, heap profiles, goroutine stack traces, allocation data, and diagnostic debugging endpoints normally guarded for global administrators only.
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
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