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CVE-2026-33634 represents a critical supply-chain compromise affecting the Aqua Security Trivy ecosystem.
Threat actors leveraged compromised release credentials to infiltrate core distribution channels.
Specifically, malicious versions of the Trivy binary, notably v0.69.4, were published.
Attackers also force-pushed malicious commits across multiple GitHub Actions repositories.
This included 76 of 77 version tags in the aquasecurity/trivy-action repository.
Similarly, all release tags in the aquasecurity/setup-trivy repository were replaced.
Furthermore, malicious container images were pushed directly to Docker Hub under active tags.
The embedded malicious payload was engineered to execute before any legitimate scanning operations.
Upon execution, the payload targets the runner’s runner.worker process memory.
It extracts sensitive environment variables via direct memory reading through /proc/$PID/mem.
The script performs comprehensive filesystem sweeps across over 50 specific paths.
It searches for confidential assets including SSH private keys and cloud provider credentials.
Targeted credentials include AWS, GCP, Azure secrets, and Kubernetes service account tokens.
It also harvests Docker configuration files, local .env files, and cryptocurrency wallets.
All harvested data undergoes strong encryption using AES-256-CBC combined with RSA-4096.
The encrypted payload is then transmitted securely to attacker-controlled external infrastructure.
As a robust fallback mechanism, if exfiltration fails, a secondary routine triggers.
This fallback mechanism creates a public repository named tpcp-docs on the victim account.
Stolen confidential secrets are then uploaded directly as public release assets there.
Because many CI/CD pipelines use mutable version tags instead of commit hashes, systems fell victim.
The attack window remained active for several days before remediation actions took effect.
Users who pulled or executed artifacts during this window faced total credential compromise.
Organizations must treat all runner-accessible secrets as fully compromised and rotate them immediately.
Remediation mandates pinning all action dependencies to immutable, full commit SHAs.
Security teams must audit workflow logs and purge any leftover malicious repository artifacts.
This incident highlights profound risks inherent in modern software supply chain dependencies.
Vigilance, rigorous artifact verification, and strict credential scoping are essential defenses.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: Aqua Security
Version: v0.69.4 release
Vulnerability: Supply Chain
Severity: Critical severity
date: March 2026
Prediction: March 2026
(end of form)
What Undercode Say
Analytics reveal that software supply chain attacks are increasingly targeting CI/CD pipelines. Threat actors bypass traditional perimeter security by compromising trusted upstream build tools and official distribution channels. By weaponizing GitHub Actions and container registries, attackers achieve widespread execution across automated runner environments without alerting standard monitoring solutions.
Bash Commands and Codes
Verify the installed Trivy scanner version trivy --version Inspect digest for upstream base images securely docker buildx imagetools inspect ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy:0.74.0 Pull safe verified container image version docker pull ghcr.io/db-infra-ops/trivy-gui:0.6.2 Start updated containers securely in detached mode docker compose pull && docker compose up -d
Exploit: (Educational Purposes!)
Conceptual illustration of how malicious code targets runner memory and files
cat << 'EOF' > exploit_concept.py
import os, glob
def scan_environment():
sensitive_paths = ["~/.ssh/", "~/.aws/", ".env", "kubeconfig"]
for path in sensitive_paths:
matches = glob.glob(os.path.expanduser(path))
print(f"Targeting path: {path} -> Found {len(matches)} items")
scan_environment()
EOF
python3 exploit_concept.py
Protection: from this CVE
Pin all GitHub Actions and third-party tools to immutable full commit SHAs instead of floating version tags.
Immediately rotate all credentials, tokens, and keys accessible to build runners active during the incident window.
Implement strict principle of least privilege for CI/CD pipeline secrets and environment variables.
Regularly audit repository release assets for unauthorized public repositories like tpcp-docs.
Utilize official repositories and verify container image digests against known secure baselines.
Impact:
Complete exposure and exfiltration of cloud provider credentials, SSH keys, and Git tokens.
Potential unauthorized access to connected production cloud environments and repositories.
Loss of data integrity and confidentiality within automated CI/CD runner execution pipelines.
Mandatory emergency credential rotation across all affected enterprise development infrastructure.
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
Extra Source Hub:
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