TUF Repository, Cyclical Delegation Vulnerability, CVE-2023-XXXX (Critical)

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How the CVE Works

The vulnerability occurs in the TUF (The Update Framework) repository when the `targets` role delegates trust to other roles, which can further delegate trust recursively. Tough, a TUF client library, fails to detect cyclical delegations (e.g., Role A delegates to Role B, which delegates back to Role A). When processing such repositories, Tough recursively traverses the delegation graph indefinitely, exhausting the call stack and causing a crash (stack overflow). This allows an attacker to craft malicious TUF metadata, triggering a denial of service (DoS) by crashing the client during update verification.

DailyCVE Form

Platform: TUF Repository
Version: < 0.20.0
Vulnerability: Cyclical Delegation
Severity: Critical
Date: 2023-XX-XX

What Undercode Say:

Exploitation:

1. Craft malicious TUF metadata with cyclical delegations:

{
"signed": {
"delegations": {
"roles": [
{ "name": "A", "keyids": [bash], "paths": [bash], "terminating": false },
{ "name": "B", "keyids": [bash], "paths": [bash], "terminating": false }
]
}
}
}

2. Host the metadata in a TUF repository.

  1. Client (tough < 0.20.0) crashes when fetching updates.

Detection:

  • Check for cycles in delegation graphs:
    def detect_cycle(graph):
    visited = set()
    def dfs(role):
    if role in visited:
    return True
    visited.add(role)
    for child in graph[bash]:
    if dfs(child):
    return True
    visited.remove(role)
    return False
    return any(dfs(role) for role in graph)
    

Mitigation:

1. Upgrade to `tough >= 0.20.0`.

2. Validate TUF metadata before processing:

curl -s https://repo.example.com/metadata.json | jq '.signed.delegations.roles'

3. Use TUF’s `in-toto` for additional integrity checks.

Debugging:

  • Monitor stack usage during TUF operations:
    ulimit -s 8192 Increase stack size temporarily
    
  • Log delegation traversal:
    fn traverse_role(role: &Role, path: &mut Vec<String>) -> Result<()> {
    if path.contains(&role.name) {
    return Err(Error::CycleDetected);
    }
    path.push(role.name.clone());
    for child in &role.delegations {
    traverse_role(child, path)?;
    }
    path.pop();
    Ok(())
    }
    

References:

References:

Reported By: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j8x2-777p-23fc
Extra Source Hub:
Undercode

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