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How CVE-2025-47729 Works
The vulnerability exists in TeleMessage’s archiving backend where it improperly stores cleartext copies of messages from TM SGNL (Archive Signal) app users despite claiming end-to-end encryption. The system fails to apply encryption before archiving, creating an unauthorized data repository. Attackers exploiting this flaw can access sensitive communications directly from the backend storage without needing decryption keys. The breach occurs when the system processes incoming messages – instead of maintaining encrypted storage as documented, it writes unprotected content to disk. This discrepancy between advertised security (E2EE) and actual implementation allows data exposure through direct database access or intercepted archive transfers.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: TeleMessage Archiving Backend
Version: Through 2025-05-05
Vulnerability: Cleartext Storage
Severity: Critical
Date: 2025-05-14
What Undercode Say:
Proof-of-Concept Exploit (Simplified)
import requests
target = "https://archive.tm.local/api/v1/messages"
headers = {"X-API-Key": "compromised_key"}
response = requests.get(target, headers=headers)
print(response.json()) Displays cleartext messages
Detection Command curl -I https://archive.tm.local/version | grep "X-TM-Version" Expected vulnerable versions: <= 2025.05.05-build47
-- Database Query to Identify Exposure SELECT FROM message_archive WHERE encryption_flag = 0;
Protection Configuration
location /api/v1/messages {
satisfy all;
deny all;
auth_basic "Restricted";
auth_basic_user_file /etc/nginx/.htpasswd;
}
// Secure Implementation Example
public void archiveMessage(EncryptedMessage msg) {
if (!msg.isEncrypted()) {
throw new SecurityException("Cleartext rejection");
}
secureStorage.write(msg); // Encrypted storage only
}
Mitigation Verification Script import hashlib def verify_encryption(data): try: json.loads(data) return False Cleartext detected except: return True Likely encrypted
Post-Exploit Forensic Analysis grep -r "E2EE" /var/log/telemessage/ | grep "false" journalctl -u telemessage-archive --since "2025-05-01"
Secure Deployment Template apiVersion: security/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: restrict-archive-access spec: ingress: - from: - ipBlock: cidr: 10.10.1.0/24 podSelector: matchLabels: app: message-archive
Sources:
Reported By: nvd.nist.gov
Extra Source Hub:
Undercode
