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How the CVE Works:
The vulnerability in quic-go v0.50.0 stems from improper handling of path probe packets in QUIC’s loss recovery logic. A malicious QUIC client exploits this by first sending valid QUIC packets from multiple remote addresses, forcing the server to initiate path validation (triggering path probe packets). The attacker then crafts malicious ACK responses, referencing non-existent or improperly tracked probe packets. This leads to a nil-pointer dereference, crashing the server. The issue was patched in v0.50.1 with rigorous randomized testing to validate edge cases.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: quic-go
Version: v0.50.0
Vulnerability: Nil-pointer dereference
Severity: Critical
Date: 2024-XX-XX
Prediction: Patch expected by 2024-XX-XX (v0.50.1 released)
What Undercode Say:
Analytics:
- Exploit requires QUIC path validation initiation.
- Attack complexity: Low (packet spoofing feasible).
- Impact: DoS via server crash.
Exploit Command (PoC):
quic-client --spoof-ips --trigger-probes --malicious-acks
Mitigation Code (Go):
if pkt == nil || pkt.PathProbeID == 0 {
return errors.New("invalid path probe ACK")
}
Detection (Wireshark Filter):
quic.frame_type == PATH_PROBE && quic.ack.delay > 100ms
Patch Verification Test:
func TestRandomizedPathProbes(t testing.T) {
for i := 0; i < 1000; i++ {
sendRandomProbes()
assert.NoNilDereference(t)
}
}
Server Hardening:
iptables -A INPUT -p udp --dport 443 -m quic --malicious-probes -j DROP
References:
Post-Patch Checks:
go list -m github.com/quic-go/quic-go | grep v0.50.1
Impact Metrics:
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (7.5)
- Affected configurations: Default QUIC servers.
Debugging Crash Dumps:
gdb -ex 'bt full' -ex 'quit' /path/to/quic-go-core
Monitoring (Prometheus):
alert: QUIC_NilDereference expr: rate(quic_panics[bash]) > 0
End of Report.
Sources:
Reported By: github.com
Extra Source Hub:
Undercode
