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How the CVE Works:
The vulnerability resides in the `LockManager.release_locks` function within the `aimhubio/aim` repository (commit bb76afe). The issue arises due to improper handling of the `run_hash` parameter, which is user-controllable. This parameter is concatenated directly into a file path without proper normalization or validation. When the `Repo._close_run()` method is invoked via the tracking server instruction API, it uses this path to delete files. An attacker can exploit this by crafting a malicious `run_hash` value containing relative path traversal sequences (e.g., ../../). This allows the attacker to delete arbitrary files on the server hosting the tracking server, potentially leading to data loss, service disruption, or further exploitation.
DailyCVE Form:
Platform: Aim
Version: Commit bb76afe
Vulnerability: Path Traversal
Severity: Critical
Date: Mar 20, 2025
What Undercode Say:
Exploitation:
- Crafting Malicious Input: An attacker can send a specially crafted `run_hash` value containing path traversal sequences (e.g.,
../../../etc/passwd) to the tracking server API. - Triggering the Vulnerability: The `Repo._close_run()` method processes the malicious input, leading to the deletion of the specified file.
- Impact: Arbitrary file deletion can result in system compromise, data loss, or denial of service.
Protection:
- Input Validation: Normalize and validate the `run_hash` parameter to prevent path traversal sequences.
- Sandboxing: Run the tracking server in a restricted environment to limit the impact of file deletion.
- Access Control: Ensure the tracking server API is only accessible to authorized users.
Commands and Code:
1. Exploit Example:
import requests
target_url = "http://target-server/api/close_run"
malicious_hash = "../../../etc/passwd"
response = requests.post(target_url, json={"run_hash": malicious_hash})
print(response.text)
2. Patch Example:
import os
from pathlib import Path
def release_locks(run_hash):
base_path = "/safe/directory"
normalized_path = Path(base_path).joinpath(run_hash).resolve()
if not str(normalized_path).startswith(base_path):
raise ValueError("Invalid path")
if normalized_path.exists():
os.remove(normalized_path)
3. Logging and Monitoring:
Monitor file deletion attempts auditctl -w /path/to/tracking/files -p wa -k file_deletion
4. Docker Sandboxing:
FROM python:3.9 WORKDIR /app COPY . . RUN pip install -r requirements.txt CMD [bash]
5. API Access Control:
location /api/ {
allow 192.168.1.0/24;
deny all;
proxy_pass http://localhost:8000;
}
By implementing these measures, the risk of exploitation can be significantly reduced.
References:
Reported By: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4qcx-jx49-6qrh
Extra Source Hub:
Undercode
